“We'd never had like a three-year vision with a coupled financial plan.”
Strategy & market
Where they agree
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Companies should narrow their target to the highest-value customer segment rather than chase everyone who shows interest.
9 independent voices · 4 shows1 new this month
On [Un]Churned, Eric Gilpin says G2 can't chase all 210,000 listed products and found a BDR leader citing enterprise as top priority had one enterprise BDR.
21 sources
Removing the qualification barrier and letting anyone sign up online was the single biggest mistake Pavilion made.
Pavilion, formerly Revenue Collective, originally had strict membership requirements and an application process. After it opened sign-up to everyone, the company moved away from its focus on go-to-market executives and let in CEOs, and Sam says the impact of those decisions was still being worked through years later.
“we made it so that you could sign up online without talking to anybody and we let in so anybody can join. That's the single biggest mistake we've made.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
UserEvidence narrowed its focus from smaller startup customers to mid-market and enterprise companies, which it found showed better product-market fit.
Evan said early customers were largely startups and growing companies, where churn was higher and product-market fit was weaker than with mid-market and larger companies. He said the mid-market and enterprise segment shows much higher net retention. The company then honed its targeting toward that segment.
“obviously much higher net retention”
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Going after everyone without a clear thesis would confuse a startup, and early numbers from a focused segment can look small but compound.
Snehal said focused customer numbers could look small in the early days, but would compound, build the company's story and help build moats. He said that without a proper thesis, pursuing every customer could confuse the company. He added that focus would have saved Outdoo maybe the first six months of the year.
“Just going and going after everyone. without a proper thesis would essentially confuse you, could confuse you.”
Founders who sell to everyone from large banks to small firms burn cash and then struggle to raise another round, so an ideal customer profile should focus early spending.
One host says tech founders often believe everyone will buy their product and that, while eventually everyone may, early on they have limited money. He recommends building an ICP and identifying which customers the product's current capabilities will deliver the most value to. He says founders who spread across customers from JPMorgan Chase down to small startups burn through money and then have a hard time getting another round of funding.
“build an ICP and try to figure out which customers at this point and the capabilities of your product are going to deliver the most amount of value to those customers”
Narrowing a company's ICPs from about 30 to four sped up growth, taking it from $8M to $30M in three years
Shipley describes a case he did the week before of a CEO who joined a company that had been operating for 20 years and reached $8M in revenue. The company went from about 30 ICPs to four and moved faster, and reached $30M in three years. Shipley presents it as counter to the instinct that a larger total addressable market is always better.
“They went from like 30 to four and then moved faster.”
Build the ICP in three cuts: who can buy, who is most likely to buy, and who has manageable sales complexity
McMahon describes building an ICP of customers that can buy, then cutting it by propensity to buy using factors specific to the product, then cutting by sales complexity, especially in startups. As an example, he says that for a small startup JP Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley might top the first list and maybe two would survive the propensity cut. The complexity cut would remove such accounts because the startup lacks time for 120-day contract negotiations.
“I don't have enough time right now to spend 120 days negotiating a contract.”
Founders who sell to every customer size at once burn their money and then struggle to raise the next round
McMahon says technical founders often believe everyone will buy their product, so they pursue customers from JP Morgan Chase down to small startups. He says they burn the money and then have a hard time getting another round of funding. He advises deciding which customers the product's current capabilities will serve with the most value.
“They get burned, they burn the money, and then they have a really hard time getting another round of funding.”
Define the ICP by where the happiest, expanding customers are, then optimise message-market fit to win them.
Dan separates product-market fit, where customers are happy and expand, from message-market fit, where the company wins new logos. He argues most teams define their ICP by where they win, when it should be defined by where happy customers will drive future growth, and then training sellers and improving marketing to raise win rates in that segment.
“I'd argue that really what we should be doing is defining our ICPs by where we have the happiest customers that will contribute to the future growth of our business.”
G2 cannot chase all 210,000 listed products, so it is narrowing its target to focus on efficiency.
G2 listing is free and 210,000 companies are listed across about 2,000 categories, with traffic unequal across categories. Eric said the team is not large enough to chase that many prospects, so the goal is to make the target smaller. He also said BDR coverage did not match the stated priority: a BDR leader who named enterprise as the top segment had only one BDR on enterprise, ten on SMB and fifteen elsewhere.
“we don't have a team large enough to chase 210,000 prospects”
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ICP should be defined by where lifetime value is highest, not by where inbound demand is strongest or where CAC is lowest.
Mark said that the two common answers, where the most inbound demand is and where CAC is lowest, are both brutally wrong. He said ICP should be correlated with the highest LTV, meaning the customers who succeed, want to retain and buy more. He said the business should then work backward to acquire those customers profitably.
“It should be correlated to where you have the highest LTV.”
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The ICP should be defined by lifetime value, not by where inbound demand comes from or what is cheapest to acquire.
Roberge says an ICP segment is one where customers see tremendous value, renew, expand and tell their friends. He notes this is sometimes not the highest inbound demand to the website and sometimes not the easiest or lowest-cost-of-acquisition segment to sell to.
“It really needs to be that the ICP is based on segments of the market where when people buy it, they see tremendous value, they renew, they expand, and they tell their friends.”
Early-stage companies often spread reps across every major city, which McMahon calls sprinkling the infield.
He says founders put one rep in each major US city instead of focusing where the ICP is. If ICP analysis is done, he says it may show the company could put three or four reps right in the Bay Area, and if that is where the ICP is, that is where the company should stay.
“They have to put one in every major city in the United States.”
Mark Roberge advises a three-tier ICP: proactively target perfect fits, accept engaged inbound from uncertain fits, and refuse poor fits even when they want to buy.
Mark reacted to Andy's comment about not turning anyone away. He frames the ICP as having an engagement dimension: a green tier of A-plus fits you build email lists for and cold-outreach, and a yellow tier you aren't sure about but will sell to if they come inbound engaged. He says Andy's stance is probably a slight exaggeration and advises against accepting everyone. Some customer types will pull you down and add noise to your roadmap for a product you didn't build for them.
“This is my perfect green where I'm going to go and proactively sell to. This is my yellow where I'm not quite sure, but if they're engaged in inbound, I'll do it.”
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Picture the target market as a dartboard with the ICP as the bullseye, the small subset of best-fit customers that renew, expand and grow
Dan said best-fit customers typically represent a small subset of the install base, and the ICP's purpose is to focus the organization on the accounts that will drive the business forward. He said that for demand gen teams with a $3 million budget to create great leads, the ICP typically fails them because it doesn't give them the information they need, so they end up leaning into quantity over quality.
“so your ICP is the bullseye of the dartboard.”
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Product-market fit may already exist in segments a company never targeted, so doubling down there can beat entering an adjacent market
Dan said that companies that haven't done this analysis will likely find fit in segments they never pursued. As an example, they may have organically acquired 35 to 40 customers in a segment they weren't proactively targeting that are growing at a healthy rate, being retained and giving positive NPS scores. He advised doubling down on these existing customer types rather than entering an adjacent market to find fit.
“you've organically acquired like 35, 40 customers in a segment that you haven't been proactively targeting that are growing at a very healthy rate”
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Before expanding your target market, identify where product-market fit is strongest in your existing customer base
Dan said most founders who want a different ICP can't say what share of their market they have already penetrated. He suggested starting with the existing customer base and looking at customer lifetime value, retention and net revenue retention to find where fit is strongest before going to adjacent markets.
“Start by looking at your customer base and saying, you know, of our 500 customers, where do we have the strongest product market fit?”
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Define your ICP by where customers get the most success and ROI, not where lead volume, lowest CAC or conversion rates are highest.
Mark Bersh argues Lauren Nemeth's ICP logic was about where people are seeing the most success and generating the biggest ROI, which he calls the value creation endgame. He says this points to product-market fit. He suggests plotting customer size against customer industry on lifetime value and customer value to decide where to scale.
“She said where people are seeing the most success.”
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Pinecone narrowed its focus to ISVs and software companies, where it sees the biggest AI workloads.
Lauren Nemeth said Pinecone stopped trying to sell to everyone, since sales teams running in 50 directions is flawed. Based on evaluations of existing customers and conversations with partners such as Anthropic, she saw interest consolidate around ISVs and software companies. She said a vector database that prides itself on scale, high throughput and data freshness needed to focus on those major workloads.
“You'll see sort of a consolidation of interest really around ISVs or software companies today”
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Start validation from hypotheses about who the early adopters are, aiming for fast early traction with conviction that the segment can expand.
Mark says a founder need not try to serve every region and industry at once, and that it is rare that boiling the ocean works. He suggests picking perhaps five cohorts, seeing which respond, then rerunning the test with only the strong cohorts. He says the early goal need not be a billion dollars in revenue, only getting to a meaningful number fast with high conviction that the segment can be expanded later.
“Maybe there's five different cohorts and let's see what happens.”
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Define the ICP by lifetime value and retention rather than by low CAC or easy close rates.
Roberge respectfully adds to Bosworth's approach. He says teams often define ICP by close rates, CAC or inbound flow, which can produce a churny business. He says sometimes the highest-LTV accounts do not have the lowest CAC, and an ICP built on exceptional LTV segments lets you afford a higher CAC.
“sometimes the highest ltv accounts don't have the lowest cac and if we're building our icp based on where our inbound leads are coming from or where our close rates are higher you can end up with a very churny business”
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Describing the ICP as software companies in marketing is too broad, and that G2 narrowed its focus to specific software categories from its taxonomy of over 2,100.
Mike said G2 had over 95,000 software companies to pick from, so each team would reach different assumptions about where to start. He said the better approach was to rank specific categories, for example category one through 2,100, to decide where to focus time and energy. He tied this to what G2 could sell and support at each package level.
“we have over 2100 categories we track. So like what's category one through category 2100”
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Point solutions will be absorbed into platforms, so winning requires covering more of the workflow on shared data.
8 independent voices · 5 shows3 new this month
On Topline, Keith Peiris predicts the Clari/Outreach sequencing and forecasting layer will be absorbed into the system of record because a good sequencer can be built in weeks.
11 sources
Asad Zaman predicts that within a year or two, companies will distill standalone products with compute, turning many standalone companies into features.
Asad's example is that a company could spend a million dollars of compute to distill a complete replica of a product like Granola. He concludes that much more product will be needed to win a category. The other hosts called the argument 'smart sounding' but wrong.
“a lot of things that are standalone companies will put on features and the amount of product you're gonna need to have. on a company to be able to win a category is going to just be that much more.”
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Keith Peiris predicts the sequencing and forecasting layer (the Clari/Outreach category) will probably be absorbed into the system of record because it has become commoditized.
Keith said a good sequencer can now be built in a couple of weeks, and so can good forecasting tools built with frontier models on top of great data. He still can't imagine Lightfield doing everything in revenue, because he sees that as infinite and says some companies will endure.
“So I think that that layer, the sort of Clari Outreach, that layer I think will probably be sucked into the system of record.”
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High-growth companies want best-of-breed, but 'best' may come from deep, shared understanding of customers rather than having every point-tool feature.
Lightfield's ICP is high-growth tech companies, and Keith says they all want best-of-breed. He asks whether best-of-breed means every Outreach sequencer feature, or a system that understands the customer and sales process well enough to do the best agent work. His analogy is Microsoft Office: Teams and PowerPoint may not be the best individually, but shared data and directory access make the suite work.
“I think the bet that a lot of people are making now is actually if you have If you have the best modeling of your customers and your prospects, that makes those other features better than the points.”
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AI makes it faster to build products for many markets, so vertical software companies should own the whole operating system, which can raise ACV in markets that were not previously VC-backable.
He points to restaurant software winners such as Toast and contractor software such as ServiceTitan, and notes that a restaurant runs more than one piece of software. He calls this a why-now argument for building new products into existing markets.
“you're better off going really deep and try to own the entire operating system, the tech stack of that business.”
Platforms that solve a single problem in the workflow will not keep customers, so the combined company needed to cover more of the workflow.
He says Clari was known for forecasting and Salesloft for engagement, and each has since expanded into the other's area. He argues that owning the workflow matters, but that a company must also be strong across all of it, not just one part.
“if you only solve one problem in the workflow you won't keep you in the room.”
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Classic point solutions carry the most risk in the AI era, more than DIY builds of full platforms.
Cassie Young says she is sceptical of vibe-coded DIY CRMs, which she thinks will work in mid-market and enterprise until the first major security breach. She sees extreme risk for classic point solutions, and notes that most startups begin as a point solution or wedge, so they must accelerate the product roadmap to avoid being replaced.
“where I think there's extreme risk in that category are like the classical point solutions.”
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Partial-platform AI tools now look more like features than companies, because full platforms make them unnecessary.
Cassie says full-platform plays are more compelling than partial-platform plays, which now feel more like features, because an end-to-end platform does the work that point tools did. Separately, she says buyers like having a throat to choke for security and governance, which makes her less worried about DIY replacing platforms. She says eight months earlier she would probably have backed a company solving one part of the problem, but now she expects buyers to adopt it for year one and then build it themselves.
“in these full platform plays versus things that even looked like partial platform plays now feel more like features”
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An AI-native CRM needs a compound startup approach to take share; Cassie sees a wedge-first path as harder.
Cassie contrasts a classical wedge play, where a company takes one clear wedge with a broad platform vision, with a compound startup approach that spans the whole customer lifecycle. She says you have to take the compound approach to take share, and that a sales-coaching company building an invisible CRM is a harder path, which is her personal conviction.
“A native CRM like you kind of have to go at it from the compound startup approach if you're really going to take share”
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Cresta expanded into a multi-product platform earlier than most would, because the products share data and intelligence and make go-to-market easier.
He described the products as sharing the same data and intelligence substrate, so the AI assistant and AI agent draw on the same workflows and knowledge base. When asked about timing, he placed it in the range of 10 to 30 million dollars of ARR.
“So there's just a lot of synergy and compounding value to build a multi -product platform little early.”
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A point solution is hard to win after AI because every incumbent can spin up the same feature, so a platform is needed.
He said there is too much competition for a point solution because every incumbent can build that feature, and that the sales cycle necessitates playing the platform game. He framed this as a meta observation about the post-AI market.
“you can't win as a point solution. There's too much competition. Every incumbent can spin up that feature.”
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Kristi suggests AI point solutions may be overtaken by embedded platforms that catch up on features, which could leave those products without a need.
She argues that point solutions focused on features are not true platforms of transformation, and that the embedded systems in organisations are innovating faster and releasing similar functionality. She says customers may then decide they already have that functionality. She says she is curious what will happen to these new products. Josh adds that some great companies will still emerge.
“they're point solutions, not platforms. The platforms are catching up.”
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Scattered AI experiments fail to create value, so AI work must be inventoried and tied to a few business goals.
7 independent voices · 3 shows
On [Un]Churned, Matthew Kropp says large companies ran about a thousand AI initiatives, mostly chatbots, without changing the business, and are now moving to three to five big rocks.
7 sources
Smartling organizes its AI work around four customer-outcome pillars: quality, speed, cost and ease of translation.
He said these pillars are the North Star for everything, including the product roadmap, and that every AI initiative has to link to them. He said anything that cannot show a material impact on one of them does not get off the ground in the BRD process, a discipline he learned from a mentor at eBay who asked what the change would do for the customer and whether it was material.
“So in our particular case, it's quality, speed. cost and ease of translation.”
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Many companies ran large numbers of AI experiments that did not create business value.
Kropp described a phase where large companies ran about a thousand AI initiatives, mostly chatbots, which got employees hands-on but did not change the business. Companies are now moving to a few big rocks, meaning three to five focused areas with a senior sponsor and an objective tied to overall corporate goals.
“But it didn't create any value.”
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Jason Goldsmith's first step was to pull 65 to 100 AI initiatives from three organizations into one place.
He said he had pulled these together in the week before the recording, currently in a PowerPoint, and said they need to live in a dashboard the team can share. He said he did not know what his extended team was doing with AI day to day. The aim is to spot overlap, such as people on different teams working on similar efforts, and pair them so they can combine work.
“I pulled together at least the you know the 65 to 100 initiatives that our three organizations are working on”
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Margo Martin found that Deltek's three post-sale organizations were duplicating AI work because nobody had an inventory of what was being built.
Her one-on-ones with the leaders of support, customer success and professional services showed them describing the same AI builds. Directors and managers were building matching tools across the three organizations, because leaders had told everyone to learn AI and go faster. She said without someone to pull it together, the organizations would keep going down three siloed paths.
“there was no inventory of all the good AI goodness that was going on within our organization”
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Letting everyone experiment with AI across many initiatives without clear owners or objectives leaves a company without focus.
Cassie Young says many organisations are trying dozens of AI initiatives without a clear owner or objectives. She compares this to the 2006 Yahoo peanut butter manifesto, where everyone spreads themselves thin across many things.
“one of the downsides of letting everybody experiment, do you know what I mean? Is you just end up without real focus.”
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Ironclad ties each AI agent on its roadmap to an OKR, so the team can see whether the agent moves a needle.
Rob said his team is working on an AI roadmap that prioritises which tools to build or use. He asked that any agent built be tied to an OKR, since Ironclad uses an OKR model. He said it is easy to start building agents, but the business still has to run, so the team needs to focus on the right areas.
“If we're going to build an agent, let's tie it to an OKR So we know it's, it's moving a needle somewhere”
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Most AI initiatives are failing to earn ROI because companies lack a strategy for AI, not because the technology does not work.
Pablo said the MIT and McKinsey reports are both accurate, but that the technology works. He said the fundamental issue is that there has not been a strategy executed on AI, and that companies spread AI initiatives thinly across many departments and sub-departments.
“The tech works. The fundamental issue is one, there hasn't been a strategy execute on AI.”
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Many incumbent SaaS companies and categories will be displaced in the AI era.
6 independent voices · 3 shows3 new this month
On [Un]Churned, Brett Queener says his forecast that 75% of customer-facing software companies would disappear has held up well enough to keep writing about.
7 sources
Her company's own SaaS revenue took an AI-related hit, and that she would be surprised if other SaaS companies were not seeing one.
Ann says the hit to Crunchbase's revenue was anticipated, and the question for SaaS companies is how quickly they can define a go-forward strategy. She says those that think they are too important to lose users will face problems.
“Anyone in the SaaS software business that's not seeing a hit to their revenue from AI, I would be surprised.”
Software vendors that assume AI will not take their revenue are mistaken, and that an MCP interface is becoming the new SaaS interface.
Ann says Crunchbase took a hit to its own revenue from AI, which it had anticipated, and that she would be surprised if any SaaS business was not seeing one. She says the SaaS companies that are fine will be those attached to AI companies in some way.
“We've already got our MCP on the front end and that's the new SaaS.”
SaaS companies that are not true systems of record will be disintermediated, and some will linger as zombie companies for 10 to 15 years.
He says companies that sit across an organization as the blood and guts, rather than as systems of record, will likely have a longer and harder road and will be disintermediated by new companies. He points to Sabre, which he says still exists as a shell of its former self, as an example of how long that decline can take.
“there's going to be this long tail of these other companies”
He is less bullish on Figma and Canva because OpenAI image models now produce strong mood boards and consistent characters.
Marc says he would have said he was still very bullish because he still uses both products, but after using the latest OpenAI image models for recent content, he would answer differently. He says that unless Figma and Canva develop proprietary technology, or become the publisher of the next great image model, they face trouble, even though the products are beautifully crafted and founder-led.
“Unless they can come up with some proprietary technology, unless they are the publishers of that next great image model and not OpenAI and not Gemini, then I think there's some trouble waters ahead here because they're beautiful products.”
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Sam is extremely bearish on legacy SaaS-era marketing platforms run by professional managers after founders left.
Sam says these companies traded multiple times on the way to around 200 to 300 million in revenue, and founders then left and brought in professional managers with no native sense for AI. He says this leaves technical and cultural debt, and that private equity ownership makes it worse, so product innovation and vision are unlikely. He contrasts companies where the founder remains, such as Salesforce with Benioff and ZoomInfo with Henry Schuck.
“And in so doing, the founders peaced out and they brought in professional managers. And the professional managers don't have any native or intuitive sense for what's going to happen with AI for the most part.”
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Lessonly's playbook would not survive in 2026 because its software had no moat and could be vibe coded in a weekend.
Kyle Lacy said Lessonly in the current market would get eaten alive, because its software was simple to use and did not have a moat. He said what still works from that era is the customer-first culture and the storytelling, which were built around the customer and part of the company's culture.
“Lesson Lee in this age would get eaten alive our software did not have emote it was really simple to use you could probably vibe code it down a weekend.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
His forecast from 18 months ago that 75% of customer-facing software companies would disappear, with 50% of categories disappearing at the same time, has held up well enough to keep writing about.
Queener says he had AI agents analyze whether he was right enough to deserve writing a new piece, and the first half of that piece reviews how the moats he expected have changed over the last 18 months. He frames the prediction as a bold call he made 18 months before the episode. The claim is his own assessment of his prediction.
“I thought I was prescient like I wrote 18 months ago, that 75% of all customer facing software companies would disappear and 50% of all categories would disappear at the same time.”
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Ranked by how many independent voices make each point and how specific their evidence is. Co-hosts of a show count as one voice, and a point needs at least two shows to appear here.
Where they split
said Brad Scott (Revenue Builders), Ghazi Masood (Topline, The Revenue Leadership Podcast, [Un]Churned), AJ Bruno (Topline), Liz Christo (Topline)
8 sources
Systems of record are hard to replace with AI, because they are wired into many departments and underpin revenue, so AI will not simply vibe-code them away.
Brad says pulling the inner workings out of products that underpin Fortune 500 revenue is incredibly painful, so he expects replacement to take much longer than the disruption thesis suggests. A host added that companies typically bought at least five packages to attach to Salesforce and wrote their own code in each department, and Brad agreed that ripping it out would kill the patient.
“everyone can't vibe code their own salesforce and those systems of record are going to be pretty sticky.”
Ghazi expects systems of record like Salesforce to stay while customers build better interfaces on top of them.
He said upmarket he is not seeing large systems of record such as ERP or core CRM being replaced, but seeing them extended with better interfaces or dashboards built on Replit. Downmarket he sees customers building their own CRM on Replit instead of buying Salesforce. Internally, Replit wants reps not to touch Salesforce, with everything built on top automating it for them.
“the systems of record are staying there but what we are seeing is we're seeing the extensibility of the systems of record”
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He does not believe anyone will switch away from their CRM, citing distribution, data and trust built with customers.
He said he remains very bearish on companies switching away from systems like Salesforce or CRM, even as switching between AI models is easy. He said he does not believe customers will switch CRM systems, citing distribution, data and the trust companies have built with their customer base. He said he is not seeing switching happen in practice.
“I don't believe anyone's going to be switching CRM”
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For a large enterprise, rebuilding the integrations to billing, finance and back office is a major cost, even if a custom build is technically possible.
Ghazi said that at a large enterprise, billing, finance, accounting, true-ups and delinquencies are tightly integrated with the front office, so a vibe-coded replacement would require rebuilding all of that plumbing. He said it could be done, but the question is whether to invest that time, and he sees it as a large uplift for organizations that have run for decades. Kyle added governance, security and stability as further heuristics for buying.
“if you're a big enterprise organization like that, you're not building your own CRM.”
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Replit keeps Salesforce as its system of record and builds its revenue workflows as internal apps on top of it.
Ghazi said Replit moved from HubSpot to Salesforce and decided not to build its own CRM. On top of Salesforce, the revenue team uses internally built Replit apps such as a revenue co-pilot dashboard, customer health, CPQ and forecasting, and he said the extensibility is what matters.
“Salesforce is our system of record.”
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A system of record is a utility that does not need to delight users, so a delightful AI-native alternative may be aimed at a different use case.
AJ Bruno says the delightful alternative Asad Zaman described and a system of record are very different use cases. He says a database is not set up to delight anyone, and that is acceptable because a system of record simply does what it needs to do. He says he does not want a Replit version of his CRM.
“And the delight, I'm not sure a database is ever set up to delight anyone. And that's, and that's okay. It's a system of record.”
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Liz still believes in the system of record, arguing that AI can strengthen one and help it build a deeper moat.
Liz says she still believes in the system of record, and acknowledges that people waffle back and forth on this debate. She says a company that is a system of record can be strengthened by AI and build a deeper moat.
“if you are a system of record you could be excuse me strengthened by AI and actually build like a deeper mode”
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Ghazi's personal view is that large enterprises will keep their systems of record such as ERP and CRM and build dashboards on top of them.
He says large enterprises are too big and have too much invested to get rid of their ERP or Salesforce-type systems. He says he sees a lot of wrappers and additional capability built on platforms like Replit to make those systems more agile, with separate dashboards pulling data from Salesforce and other systems.
“You're not going to go get rid of their ERP system or their, you know, their sales force system or their CRM system.”
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said Asad Zaman (Topline), Liz Christo (Topline), Sam Jacobs (Topline)
6 sources
Asad Zaman expects cheaper switching and delightful new software to compress the moats around system-of-record incumbents.
Asad Zaman says he has a feeling that customers will have less stickiness with platforms as AI makes it easier to move quickly. He contrasts the old software that never delighted him with a recent Replit experience he found delightful. He says he expects a significant shift in how these companies make customers feel.
“I have a feeling that where we're going, customers have less stickiness with platforms”
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Strong net revenue retention at legacy software companies may have masked customers who felt trapped rather than loyal.
Asad Zaman says some software companies had signs of strong customer relationships, such as high NRR, but their customers felt locked in with no good alternatives. He says the switching alternative was more painful than the status quo. He presents this as a reason to reassess the moats of those companies.
“there was a generation of software companies that had signs that they had really good customer relationships. You know, NRR is an example of that. But their customers felt more like prisoners.”
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Switching costs have fallen and will keep falling, prompting a host to ask what stickiness she would still underwrite.
She says it is becoming easier to keep data outside a software system, to access it in real time, and to move it with AI or integrations, which reduces the pain of switching that software once had. A host then asked her what version of stickiness she is still willing to underwrite.
“the switching costs have gone down and I think will continue to go down as it's easier to have your data outside of the system”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
A host expects Salesforce to face many more competitors, which he says will sharply reduce its pricing power, though he does not expect companies to build their own CRMs.
The speaker says the cost of generating software has fallen so low that there will be 10 times more competitors to Salesforce, even though he does not think people will spin up their own CRM to replace it. He says this will dramatically reduce the pricing power and leverage Salesforce has with customers. Another host said he was not sure that was true.
“But there are going to be 10 times more competitors to Salesforce. And so the pricing power and leverage that Salesforce has with their customers is going to dramatically fall.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Legacy companies have lost pricing leverage and need to rethink strategy, but the claim that AI is an existential risk to white-collar work has no precedent yet.
Sam Jacobs says the argument that certain legacy companies have lost leverage and need to rethink their strategy sounds valid to him, but the argument that the technology represents a fundamental existential risk to white-collar work has no precedent. Asad Zaman agrees, saying he does not believe in that risk yet and does not want to react to any one quick thing.
“My point is the argument that certain legacy companies have lost leverage and need to rethink their strategy in the wake of this new technology, that sounds valid to me.”
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Systems of record will lose pricing power as accessing data becomes less critical, though Sam did not expect them to disappear.
Sam Jacobs said database and system-of-record vendors like Workday face pressure because accessing the data will no longer be the critical thing, so they will have less leverage. He said the core premise was that customers rarely switch, and that this is now less certain, while software as a category will keep growing around the agentic layer.
“therefore they will have less pricing power and less leverage”
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One side looks at large enterprises with deep data and distribution lock-in; the other at falling AI-driven switching costs and SMB-style alternatives.
said Dev Ittycheria (The Twenty Minute VC), Ann Davis (Revenue Builders), Gaurav Agarwal (Topline), Liz Christo (Topline)
4 sources
Dev Ittycheria splits AI apps into 'features masking as companies', which will sell, and franchises built on proprietary data loops.
Dev Ittycheria said a clever product on someone else's platform is frankly a feature, and he expects many such AI app companies to sell to larger companies for their distribution. Durable companies create a loop: usage generates data no one else has, that data improves the product, and the product attracts more usage. Competitors can then copy features but not interactions.
“are you building a feature that's masking as a company or a franchise, right?”
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Crunchbase's competitive position rests on its private-market dataset plus visibility into how its users interact with the software.
Ann says Crunchbase has more private-market data from inception through Series K than anyone, covering company profiles, competitors, investors and funding rounds. She adds that its 80 million-plus software users give the company behavioural signals that others cannot access, which lets it judge whether a company is gaining or losing momentum.
“having all this data and our 80 million plus users of the software and being able to watch their digital body language that nobody else has access to”
Gaurav predicted that the companies that own the user relationship will win in the near to mid term, because they can build feedback loops to train models.
He said that at some point there will be limited training data available and models will peak, so whoever owns the user can use their interactions to improve models. He described this as the near-term winner, with a more uncertain outcome if AGI arrives.
“whoever owns the user will be able to build feedback loops to train their models better.”
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Proprietary data is the first durable moat Liz names, either held already or built over time by a system of action.
Liz says proprietary data is definitely the first durable advantage. A company may already have that data, or it may be a system of action that captures data and accumulates it over time. She says she still thinks this is real.
“Proprietary data is definitely the first one.”
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said Chase Lochmiller (The Twenty Minute VC), Harry Stebbings (The Twenty Minute VC), Josh Schachter ([Un]Churned), Brett Queener ([Un]Churned), Arvind Jain (Grit)
7 sources
He changed his mind in the past year and now believes most moats are illusory, so speed and adaptability are what create advantage.
He notes that VCs love to ask about long-term moats. He now thinks most moats are ephemeral, especially while model capabilities are advancing quickly. In his view, advantage comes from moving quickly and adapting to an ever-changing 'chessboard'.
“I think what I've changed my mind on is most moats are illusion. Most moats don't exist. Most of them are ephemeral”
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Harry Stebbings largely thinks moats are bullshit, and that what matters is speed of decision-making, product execution and building value quickly.
Stebbings says he was mocked for investing in Lovable because it was 'a wrapper', and concedes it was one. He argues that wrapper companies win by building very valuable features very quickly and compounding that over time.
“it's about speed of decision -making, product execution, and building value over time very, very fast.”
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An AI-efficient engineering team that moves quickly can be a lasting competitive moat.
Josh describes a conversation with the founder and CEO of Zora, who is transforming his whole company but says engineering matters most because it keeps him ahead. Josh says this reminds him of what Ziv said about Gong: a company that stays far ahead and efficient in what it builds will keep a moat.
“if companies can stay so far ahead and be efficient with what they're building, that will continue to be a moat for them.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Traditional SaaS moats such as the system of record and accumulated context are now table stakes, a right to play rather than a right to win.
He says moats he once thought would let a company win a game have become the price of entry. He gives a basketball analogy: being fit gives you the right to play but does not win the game. He presents this as a shift he and others have experienced over the last 18 months.
“They're just table stakes. So you don't have them, you can't play, but they're not a right to win”
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Jain calls speed of adaptation the new currency: how fast a company can change its product and code to use the latest technology.
He argues that quickly changing product and code gives leverage to take advantage of the latest technology as it is built. He says this matters more than ever because the pace of change is so fast. He presents it as his view of what now matters most in building software.
“So the new currency now, and well, I guess it's always been, but it's like it's more important than ever before is how fast you can adapt, change, change your product, change your code.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
For most companies, competitive differentiation is customer understanding plus software speed, and a real moat is rare
Schuck said he believes most companies, perhaps nearly all, differentiate on how well they understand the customers they build for and how quickly they can ship software those customers value. He said a few companies get a moat, usually from a network or flywheel effect or a contributory data asset where every new customer strengthens the product. He said he would invest in building a moat once there is clear conviction about how it will be created.
“And I think like for most companies, maybe all, just about all companies, your competitive differentiation, I believe, is how well do you understand the customers you're building software for?”
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Strong execution is, in many cases, the only real moat a company can build.
Stevie said every investor asks what protects a business, and she is a big believer that strong execution is the only real moat that can be built in many cases. Mark partly disagreed: he said you don't always need a moat and can outpace competitors without one, but a moat is a huge advantage if you have it, and pointed to Porter's barriers to entry.
“strong execution is the only real moat that you can build in many cases.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Skeptics focus on fast-changing, model-dependent layers; believers on businesses that accumulate unique usage data over time.
said Manny Medina (Topline), Steve Cox (Topline), Michael Walrath (Topline), AJ Bruno (Topline), Kyle Norton (Topline)
6 sources
Manny Medina predicts that no software will be non-agentic within five years, and that SaaS incumbents, not upstarts, are the primary beneficiaries.
Manny says he used to argue around San Francisco that SaaS was dead and would take the shift lying down, but has changed his mind. SaaS companies already have knowledge and workflows embedded in their software, which makes them best placed to build agents on top of their stack. Their challenge is figuring out how to capture value, and if they don't, someone else will.
“So they are the primary beneficiaries of building agents on top of their stack. And they just need to figure out how to capture value. And if they don't, somebody else will.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Steve Cox is not planning to spend time fighting the narrative that AI will replace SaaS, because he expects it to play out on its own.
He points to SaaS companies that recovered in the stock market after the SaaS selloff, with growth, retention and earnings numbers that he says remain strong. He says his concern is not the AI-disruption narrative itself.
“I think this will naturally play its course.”
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There is very little evidence that AI-native companies are taking software spend from incumbents.
He called this the inconvenient truth of the SaaS apocalypse: there is very little evidence the software pie is being eaten in any meaningful way by AI-native companies. A host agreed, pointing to Yext's own churn data, where accounts spending over $50k a year (about 90% of revenue) show almost no churn, and said AI-era growers are generating other revenue rather than taking that share.
“actually there's very little evidence right now that that the software pie is being in any meaningful way by the AI native companies.”
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AJ Bruno is bullish that ServiceNow can double its revenue to $32 billion by 2030, citing its distribution.
AJ Bruno says the market has over-rotated against companies like ServiceNow and that its distribution, at a scale comparable to Salesforce, is the key factor. He links this to the view that public incumbents such as Atlassian may work out how to adapt.
“ServiceNow is on the scale of Salesforce and their distribution and power distribution.”
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Kyle Norton has moved from bearish to very bullish on Salesforce because it has become the hub for integrations, partners, governance and AI.
Kyle Norton says Salesforce's acquisitions, including Bluebirds, Momentum and Informatica, show it is all in on AI. He says the ecosystem gives Salesforce an advantage as the pivot point where integrations, partners, roles and permissions sit. Another participant adds that growing a $40 billion business may be hard to show in public markets, but that this doesn't stop Salesforce from delivering value to CROs and sales teams.
“I went from being a bear on Salesforce 24 months ago to being like very bullish on Salesforce now”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
AI replacing SaaS is a lazy argument; AI is compressing the time value of money, so market corrections are happening faster.
AJ Bruno argued that the common view that AI will replace SaaS misses the point. He said AI is compressing the time value of money, so public markets are repricing software companies more quickly than before.
“What AI is doing is it's compressing the time value of money.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
said Ann Davis (Revenue Builders), Brad Scott (Revenue Builders), Marc Ferrentino (Topline), Sam Jacobs (Topline), Kyle Lacy (Topline), Brett Queener ([Un]Churned)
7 sources
Her company's own SaaS revenue took an AI-related hit, and that she would be surprised if other SaaS companies were not seeing one.
Ann says the hit to Crunchbase's revenue was anticipated, and the question for SaaS companies is how quickly they can define a go-forward strategy. She says those that think they are too important to lose users will face problems.
“Anyone in the SaaS software business that's not seeing a hit to their revenue from AI, I would be surprised.”
Software vendors that assume AI will not take their revenue are mistaken, and that an MCP interface is becoming the new SaaS interface.
Ann says Crunchbase took a hit to its own revenue from AI, which it had anticipated, and that she would be surprised if any SaaS business was not seeing one. She says the SaaS companies that are fine will be those attached to AI companies in some way.
“We've already got our MCP on the front end and that's the new SaaS.”
SaaS companies that are not true systems of record will be disintermediated, and some will linger as zombie companies for 10 to 15 years.
He says companies that sit across an organization as the blood and guts, rather than as systems of record, will likely have a longer and harder road and will be disintermediated by new companies. He points to Sabre, which he says still exists as a shell of its former self, as an example of how long that decline can take.
“there's going to be this long tail of these other companies”
He is less bullish on Figma and Canva because OpenAI image models now produce strong mood boards and consistent characters.
Marc says he would have said he was still very bullish because he still uses both products, but after using the latest OpenAI image models for recent content, he would answer differently. He says that unless Figma and Canva develop proprietary technology, or become the publisher of the next great image model, they face trouble, even though the products are beautifully crafted and founder-led.
“Unless they can come up with some proprietary technology, unless they are the publishers of that next great image model and not OpenAI and not Gemini, then I think there's some trouble waters ahead here because they're beautiful products.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Sam is extremely bearish on legacy SaaS-era marketing platforms run by professional managers after founders left.
Sam says these companies traded multiple times on the way to around 200 to 300 million in revenue, and founders then left and brought in professional managers with no native sense for AI. He says this leaves technical and cultural debt, and that private equity ownership makes it worse, so product innovation and vision are unlikely. He contrasts companies where the founder remains, such as Salesforce with Benioff and ZoomInfo with Henry Schuck.
“And in so doing, the founders peaced out and they brought in professional managers. And the professional managers don't have any native or intuitive sense for what's going to happen with AI for the most part.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Lessonly's playbook would not survive in 2026 because its software had no moat and could be vibe coded in a weekend.
Kyle Lacy said Lessonly in the current market would get eaten alive, because its software was simple to use and did not have a moat. He said what still works from that era is the customer-first culture and the storytelling, which were built around the customer and part of the company's culture.
“Lesson Lee in this age would get eaten alive our software did not have emote it was really simple to use you could probably vibe code it down a weekend.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
His forecast from 18 months ago that 75% of customer-facing software companies would disappear, with 50% of categories disappearing at the same time, has held up well enough to keep writing about.
Queener says he had AI agents analyze whether he was right enough to deserve writing a new piece, and the first half of that piece reviews how the moats he expected have changed over the last 18 months. He frames the prediction as a bold call he made 18 months before the episode. The claim is his own assessment of his prediction.
“I thought I was prescient like I wrote 18 months ago, that 75% of all customer facing software companies would disappear and 50% of all categories would disappear at the same time.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Optimists point to incumbents with distribution, embedded workflows and AI investment; pessimists to simple, moatless or professionally managed post-founder products.
From one operator's experience
What one named guest described doing or seeing. Each is a single account, not a point several operators agree on.
“the best companies always got offers to sell”
“I love you guys, but it's not the right type of customer. They're not in the game right now. I want companies that are growing fast.”
“They use about the same water annually as about 10 single family homes.”
“Six customers, a million in revenue. It's like, okay, well yeah, there's a lot of people that want this. People willing to pay us real contracts.”
“very few transformative AI programs happen within companies now if the CEO isn't involved”
What to do
- Build your ICP in John McMahon's three cuts (can buy, likely to buy, manageable sales complexity), then cap use cases at three or four, as he did at BladeLogic (Revenue Builders).
4 sources
Build the ICP in three cuts: who can buy, who is most likely to buy, and who has manageable sales complexity
McMahon describes building an ICP of customers that can buy, then cutting it by propensity to buy using factors specific to the product, then cutting by sales complexity, especially in startups. As an example, he says that for a small startup JP Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley might top the first list and maybe two would survive the propensity cut. The complexity cut would remove such accounts because the startup lacks time for 120-day contract negotiations.
“I don't have enough time right now to spend 120 days negotiating a contract.”
Cut a product's use cases to three or four so that sales and marketing effort points at one place
When McMahon joined BladeLogic, executives listed 13 use cases on a whiteboard. He said he could not build a world-class sales force selling to 13 use cases and asked to narrow to three or four. He says that if a buyer came in wanting use case number nine he would qualify them quickly and drop it if the sales cycle would be long, rather than hunt for it.
“I can't build a sales force that's world class and selling to 13 use cases.”
Narrowing from 13 use cases to three or four let sales, marketing and product focus on the same buyers.
John McMahon describes joining BladeLogic, where executives listed 13 use cases on a board. He says he could not build a sales force, marketing or product to sell world-class to 13 use cases, so the team narrowed to three or four, and he would still listen to outside requests but would not point the sales team at them.
“And I said, because I can't build a sales force that can sell world-class to 13 use cases.”
Narrowing a company's ICPs from about 30 to four sped up growth, taking it from $8M to $30M in three years
Shipley describes a case he did the week before of a CEO who joined a company that had been operating for 20 years and reached $8M in revenue. The company went from about 30 ICPs to four and moved faster, and reached $30M in three years. Shipley presents it as counter to the instinct that a larger total addressable market is always better.
“They went from like 30 to four and then moved faster.”
- Add use case as a CRM field and rank segments by LTV, retention and NRR before entering adjacent markets, following Dan Sperring (Revenue Builders, Science of Scaling), who found two of 15 use cases drove almost all revenue at one client.
4 sources
Use case is missing from around 90% of B2B SaaS CRMs, and it is where the strongest ICP signal shows up.
Dan says the use case construct is missing from like 90% of CRMs, and that use case is where the strongest signal for quantifying product-market fit typically appears. He argues ICP work should start from use case, with firmographics treated as proxies for it.
“that construct of use cases and B2B SaaS are used missing from like 90% of CRMs.”
Adding use case to an ICP model surfaced two of 15 use cases driving almost all revenue at an $80 million security SaaS company.
Dan says a client, an $80 million SaaS company in the security industry, supports 15 use cases. Its own ICP model had weak signal until use case was added, after which two use cases drove almost all revenue: one focused on acquisition, and one a maturity model where a customer buys product A first and product B later.
“for them of the 15, there was two that was driving almost all their revenue.”
Before expanding your target market, identify where product-market fit is strongest in your existing customer base
Dan said most founders who want a different ICP can't say what share of their market they have already penetrated. He suggested starting with the existing customer base and looking at customer lifetime value, retention and net revenue retention to find where fit is strongest before going to adjacent markets.
“Start by looking at your customer base and saying, you know, of our 500 customers, where do we have the strongest product market fit?”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Product-market fit may already exist in segments a company never targeted, so doubling down there can beat entering an adjacent market
Dan said that companies that haven't done this analysis will likely find fit in segments they never pursued. As an example, they may have organically acquired 35 to 40 customers in a segment they weren't proactively targeting that are growing at a healthy rate, being retained and giving positive NPS scores. He advised doubling down on these existing customer types rather than entering an adjacent market to find fit.
“you've organically acquired like 35, 40 customers in a segment that you haven't been proactively targeting that are growing at a very healthy rate”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Sort accounts into green, yellow and red zones so reps prospect only perfect fits, take engaged inbound from edge cases and refuse poor fits, per Mark Roberge (Revenue Builders, Science of Scaling).
3 sources
Roberge sorts ICP attributes into green, yellow and red zones, with yellow letting the company explore the edge of the ICP.
He says a company may have five to eight ICP attributes such as company size, location and industry. In his working example, green was US companies with $50 million to $500 million in revenue in healthcare and finance, which reps should pursue actively; red was Europe, Asia, manufacturing or over $500 million in revenue, which the company would not sell to and would rip up if sold; and yellow was an edge case, such as a tech company with $40 million in revenue, which is sold when inbound demand arrives.
“that allows us to, create a structure where we can explore the periphery of the ICP to naturally expand.”
Mark Roberge advises a three-tier ICP: proactively target perfect fits, accept engaged inbound from uncertain fits, and refuse poor fits even when they want to buy.
Mark reacted to Andy's comment about not turning anyone away. He frames the ICP as having an engagement dimension: a green tier of A-plus fits you build email lists for and cold-outreach, and a yellow tier you aren't sure about but will sell to if they come inbound engaged. He says Andy's stance is probably a slight exaggeration and advises against accepting everyone. Some customer types will pull you down and add noise to your roadmap for a product you didn't build for them.
“This is my perfect green where I'm going to go and proactively sell to. This is my yellow where I'm not quite sure, but if they're engaged in inbound, I'll do it.”
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Strong bookings growth can hide a closed-won base that is mostly outside your ICP.
Dan says he spent seven years at Urban Airship, joining at around $5 million and helping scale it to about $70 million. Separately, during the COVID period, churn that moved with vaccine releases and new variants gave him a clear signal. He realised that in quarters with roughly 400% year-over-year growth, which were celebrated, about 90% of the customers closed were outside the ICP.
“we had 400% year-over-year growth, we were high-fiving the celebrating, not realizing that like 90% of the customers that were closed one were outside of ICP.”
- Launch new products or segments with a small dedicated team measured on retention rather than revenue, and keep their revenue out of the plan until fit is proven, as Mark Roberge (Science of Scaling) describes. Usha Iyer (Revenue Leadership Podcast) ran an acquired product through a three-person SWAT team for six months before rolling it out.
5 sources
A large company launching a new product can stage its sales coverage at 5, then 50, then 500 reps, starting by proving product-market fit with five.
Roberge describes a Stage 2 LP who does this at Microsoft, using five reps to prove product-market fit, then 50, then 500. He says the timing of each stage is unknown, whether a week, a quarter or a year. He contrasts this with a typical launch where a full sales force starts selling at a conference before product-market fit exists and misses the number by something like 50%.
“Give me five reps. Let me prove product market fit according to the science of scaling.”
Mark suggests putting most new hires into the proven motion while each new market or product test runs as a startup measured on retention rather than revenue.
In his org sketch, the known SMB team takes most new reps, while an enterprise test and a new product test each get a small team of a go-to-market generalist, a product manager and engineers. He says these units should first find product-market fit and go-to-market fit, and revenue is not their North Star.
“Their North Star's not a revenue contribution.”
Founders often commit revenue from a new product or market before it has been proven, which pushes them to scale it too early.
Using made-up numbers, Mark describes a company aiming to grow from $10M to $40M in 2027 that assumes an enterprise push and a new product will supply the missing $10M and puts that revenue in the plan. He argues the company should first test and learn, as it did in its first years, rather than scale the new bet right away.
“The mistake that many founders make here is committing to revenue on new products or new markets before you've adequately proven them out”
Don't commit to an enterprise revenue target until you've re-established product-market fit and go-to-market fit for that segment.
Mark Roberge says teams routinely assume their existing demand generation, playbook, sales hires, comp plan and pricing will only need tweaking to sell to enterprise, and that this is usually very wrong. Messaging, hires, comp plans and territories all need to be re-validated. He warns against walking into annual planning and committing to something like $10M in enterprise next year with only three beta customers.
“the last thing we want to be doing is walking into an annual planning process, having not already reduced all that uncertainty and committing to a target like we're going to do 10 million next year in the enterprise, even though we only have three beta customers.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
HiveBright ran the acquired Orbit product through a three-person SWAT team for six months before rolling it out to the whole organization.
Usha says HiveBright set up a team of three people outside sales, customer success and implementation to secure the first Orbit customer and work out how to take it to market. For the first six months, the SWAT team joined sales cycles where Orbit could be pitched, and the team picked up the first million dollars of revenue that way before organization-wide rollout.
“we set up a SWAT team of just three people outside of sales, outside of customer success, outside of implementation.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- If you are clearly not blitzscaling, redesign go-to-market around Rule of 40 and cash flow, as Mark Roberge (Science of Scaling) and Sam Jacobs (Topline) urge.
3 sources
VC-backed startups that are clearly not going to blitzscale should redesign their go-to-market system around Rule of 40 instead of keeping the grow-at-all-costs playbook.
Roberge says venture funding brings an expectation of a blitzscale plan. Two to four years in, he says, it works out about 10% of the time and fails about 90% of the time. The problem is that founders don't change the go-to-market system design even when it's clear they won't be a $10B company. He claims that switching to Rule of 40 to become default alive gives a better than 50% shot at returning hundreds of millions of dollars to founders, employees and investors, or at getting back on the unicorn track, and cites Henry at ZoomInfo as an example.
“Even though it's very clear that we're not a blitz scale, that we're not a grow all cost, that we're not going to be a $10 billion company, we still apply the same go -to -market system design and approach. Wrong. We got to shift.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
VC-funded SaaS companies not growing at AI rates are out of choices and should aim to become cash-flow positive.
Sam said SaaS companies in the middle, growing 30 to 50%, need a path out. That path is to become cash-flow positive and, whether or not they are valued at 10 to 15 times ARR, build a cash flow stream that could be paid back to shareholders, making the business more like a regular business.
“You're out of choices if you're not growing at AI rates.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Software gross margins no longer cushion go-to-market spending because companies now have to pay for inference and compute.
Cassie Young says the GTM bloat era is over: in traditional software, rich gross margins hid waste in operating expenses, but companies advancing their own products now have to invest in inference and compute. She says go-to-market leaders face a reckoning because they can no longer operate the way they used to.
“In a world where companies have to invest in inference and compute because they're advancing their own products, we don't have that luxury anymore.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
5 more
- Run discovery like a hard sales cycle, asking about price, budget source, internal ROI and who is involved; Jesse Zhang (Grit) credits this with getting Decagon through the idea maze in about three weeks.
3 sources
Decagon got through the idea maze in about three weeks by running founder discovery like an aggressive sales cycle.
Avoiding a long idea maze was an explicit goal at founding. Zhang says most founders shy away from being aggressive because it feels too salesy, and default to soft questions like 'would you use this?' Instead, he and Ashwin asked how much the buyer would pay, where the budget would come from, how ROI is justified internally and who is involved. Zhang acknowledges luck played a part.
“they'll appreciate if you're asking more tough questions, like how much we pay for this, where's the budget coming from, like how do you justify ROI internally, like who are the people involved?”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Before joining a company, ask why the customer must buy, why from them, and why now
McMahon says he checks whether a company can answer three questions: why does the customer have to buy, why do they have to buy from you, and above all why do they have to do it now rather than use a workaround. He says if those questions cannot be answered he is checking his watch and leaving.
“Why does the customer have to buy? Why do they have to buy? Why do they have to buy from you? And the big one, why do they have to do it now?”
A narrow phone checkout app got little customer engagement, but asking restaurateurs about their technology more broadly surfaced recurring pain.
Toast's founders built a phone-based checkout app for restaurants and saw almost no traction for about nine months. When they changed the conversation to how restaurateurs felt about their technology in general, they found that none liked their legacy platforms and that restaurants used more technology than the founders expected, often re-keying orders and manually exporting data between systems.
“We got barely any time from. customers. But when we pivoted the conversation to talk about like, hey, how do you like your technology more broadly?”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Move product strategy toward owning a record or proprietary data loop rather than a replaceable workflow, as Manny Medina (Topline), Ann Davis (Revenue Builders) and Dev Ittycheria (20VC) advise.
4 sources
Manny Medina chose to build Paid as a system of record rather than a workflow tool, because workflow products face constant churn risk.
Paid owns the record of what the agent did, the credits charged and the auditability of both, which Manny calls a financial record. He acknowledges a higher bar, since billing errors and credit misassignments are a real risk when code is increasingly writing itself. He says workflow tools are like being a shark: always moving, with customers able to churn at any minute.
“I don't want to build workflows anymore because workflows is like being a shark.”
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To avoid being reduced to a system of record, a data provider should build proprietary datasets competitors cannot replicate and expand its data distribution partnerships.
Ann says Crunchbase recognised before she joined that AI would likely take a large part of its business, so it prioritised datasets that competitors could not copy. She says the second part is supporting the new solutions being built on top of its data through a data distribution partnership strategy.
“the best way to do that is to develop proprietary data sets that they can't replicate.”
Dev Ittycheria splits AI apps into 'features masking as companies', which will sell, and franchises built on proprietary data loops.
Dev Ittycheria said a clever product on someone else's platform is frankly a feature, and he expects many such AI app companies to sell to larger companies for their distribution. Durable companies create a loop: usage generates data no one else has, that data improves the product, and the product attracts more usage. Competitors can then copy features but not interactions.
“are you building a feature that's masking as a company or a franchise, right?”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Classic point solutions carry the most risk in the AI era, more than DIY builds of full platforms.
Cassie Young says she is sceptical of vibe-coded DIY CRMs, which she thinks will work in mid-market and enterprise until the first major security breach. She sees extreme risk for classic point solutions, and notes that most startups begin as a point solution or wedge, so they must accelerate the product roadmap to avoid being replaced.
“where I think there's extreme risk in that category are like the classical point solutions.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Test any acquisition offer by honestly estimating your odds of reaching 10x its value, using Rory O'Driscoll's framing (20VC) alongside Jason Lemkin's 'generational company' bar.
3 sources
Rory O'Driscoll frames an acquisition offer as a cold-blooded test of whether you can reach 10x the offer.
Rory O'Driscoll said founders evaluating an offer must be cold-blooded about the likely trajectory. The question is how they feel about 'running the tape', and how likely they are to reach not just three times the offer but 10x or more.
“how likely are you to get not just three times this amount, but 10X this amount and more?”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
If you can sell for ~$2B in the first five years and aren't building a generational company, you should probably take it.
Jason Lemkin said company-building comes in five-year chunks that 'take it out of you', and exiting early is much easier. He said he wasn't saying it's a reason to sell. He said that this year he sat in a board meeting where every VC told a company with an offer at about this price not to sell. In his view the decision hinges on whether you're building a 'Mongo or better'.
“You can get out for two billion in the first five years and you're not building Mongo or better. I don't know, man. I would take it and enjoy my life at Salesforce.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
BladeLogic turned down acquisition approaches at several stages before selling to BMC for about $900M on roughly $100M revenue.
Dev Ittycheria said the best companies always get offers. BladeLogic was approached at every stage, including a face-to-face meeting with John Chambers in his office about Cisco buying it, and EMC came to the table. It IPO'd in July 2007 and sold to BMC about a year later for roughly $900M, about 9x revenue, which he called the highest acquisition price paid in 2008. He said the founder ultimately has to decide whether they feel good continuing to build, and that not selling earlier was the right call.
“the best companies always got offers to sell”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Limit competitive analysis to five or six bump competitors and proxies, and fund only differentiators no more than one rival matches, per Dr. Chuck Bamford (Revenue Builders). Add Lou Shipley's 'murder board' question of how a $50M-funded startup would kill you.
3 sources
Build the competitor list from bump competitors and proxies, and keep it to five or six companies.
Chuck calls the companies you win against, lose to, or meet most often bump competitors, and adds proxies for companies doing something unique. He says to confirm the list with customers and not to take more than five or six, because too many competitors will overwhelm the analysis.
“So I always start with what we call bump competitors, right?”
A differentiator is not rare if more than one competitor does it as well as you.
Chuck's rule of thumb is that if only one other company does something as well, it is still relatively rare, but if more than one does, it is orthodox. Orthodox things should be done well but not better than others, and the team should put its money, time and attention into the true separators.
“my rule of thumb is if one other company is doing it just as good as me, still pretty rare, but if more than one is, then it's orthodox.”
A murder board asks how a well-funded competitor would kill your company, to surface weaknesses early
Shipley describes the murder board as putting an idea in front of a panel asked to shut it down, built around the question: if a startup got $50 million from a Silicon Valley VC, how would it kill our company? He borrowed the method from army friends who plan missions by working out what will go wrong, and applies it to product launches and new companies. He says every company has weaknesses and that at Black Duck he found a culture of optics that made everything sound better than it was. He agreed with a host that it is also useful before pitching VCs.
“If you were a startup and you got 50 million bucks from a Silicon Valley CEO or VC, how would you kill our company?”
- When courting large platform partners, sign one first to create competitive pressure on the rest, as Alan Chhabra did with hyperscalers at MongoDB (Revenue Builders). Frame the deal so the partner's own technology stays central.
3 sources
At MongoDB, signing one hyperscaler first created competitive pressure that brought the others into the partnership.
Hyperscalers were offering their own open source database as a service, so MongoDB asked them to sell its enterprise versions instead. Alan says Google signed first, and when AWS was competing with Google it then wanted in, followed by Microsoft, with the pitch that MongoDB's sales teams could back a hyperscaler or compete with it.
“So which hyperscaler wants to get with us first?”
Cerebras won an AWS deal by pitching a joint architecture that pairs Trainium with Cerebras, so AWS's own chip stays central.
Rather than asking AWS to add a third-party chip, Alan says the architecture splits the work: Trainium handles prefill, the input of tokens, and Cerebras handles decode, the output. He says this leverages AWS's own IP and is competitive on price performance, and that AWS has signed a big deal with Cerebras which is being rolled out this year.
“You really have to come up with the angle that they're going to buy into. That's a win for them long term.”
Cracking hyperscalers is extremely political, because they depend on Nvidia supply and are building their own chips, so technical merit alone does not decide.
Alan says hyperscalers have deep relationships with Nvidia and do not want to upset that supply chain. When a host notes that in a shortage Nvidia could put a hyperscaler on the slow boat, Alan agrees it is a lot about supply and demand. He also says hyperscalers are building their own AI chips, such as Trainium, Microsoft's Maia and Google's TPUs, so they want to stay relevant to the stack.
“cracking the hyperscalers is extremely political”
All 50 positions best supported first
- Companies should narrow their target to the highest-value customer segment rather than chase everyone who shows interest.
9 independent voices · 4 shows1 new this month
said Sam Jacobs (Topline), Evan Huck (Topline), Snehal Nimje (Topline), Lou Shipley (Revenue Builders), John McMahon (Revenue Builders), Dan Sperring (Revenue Builders, The Science of Scaling) and 2 more
21 sources
Removing the qualification barrier and letting anyone sign up online was the single biggest mistake Pavilion made.
Pavilion, formerly Revenue Collective, originally had strict membership requirements and an application process. After it opened sign-up to everyone, the company moved away from its focus on go-to-market executives and let in CEOs, and Sam says the impact of those decisions was still being worked through years later.
“we made it so that you could sign up online without talking to anybody and we let in so anybody can join. That's the single biggest mistake we've made.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
UserEvidence narrowed its focus from smaller startup customers to mid-market and enterprise companies, which it found showed better product-market fit.
Evan said early customers were largely startups and growing companies, where churn was higher and product-market fit was weaker than with mid-market and larger companies. He said the mid-market and enterprise segment shows much higher net retention. The company then honed its targeting toward that segment.
“obviously much higher net retention”
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Going after everyone without a clear thesis would confuse a startup, and early numbers from a focused segment can look small but compound.
Snehal said focused customer numbers could look small in the early days, but would compound, build the company's story and help build moats. He said that without a proper thesis, pursuing every customer could confuse the company. He added that focus would have saved Outdoo maybe the first six months of the year.
“Just going and going after everyone. without a proper thesis would essentially confuse you, could confuse you.”
Founders who sell to everyone from large banks to small firms burn cash and then struggle to raise another round, so an ideal customer profile should focus early spending.
One host says tech founders often believe everyone will buy their product and that, while eventually everyone may, early on they have limited money. He recommends building an ICP and identifying which customers the product's current capabilities will deliver the most value to. He says founders who spread across customers from JPMorgan Chase down to small startups burn through money and then have a hard time getting another round of funding.
“build an ICP and try to figure out which customers at this point and the capabilities of your product are going to deliver the most amount of value to those customers”
Narrowing a company's ICPs from about 30 to four sped up growth, taking it from $8M to $30M in three years
Shipley describes a case he did the week before of a CEO who joined a company that had been operating for 20 years and reached $8M in revenue. The company went from about 30 ICPs to four and moved faster, and reached $30M in three years. Shipley presents it as counter to the instinct that a larger total addressable market is always better.
“They went from like 30 to four and then moved faster.”
Build the ICP in three cuts: who can buy, who is most likely to buy, and who has manageable sales complexity
McMahon describes building an ICP of customers that can buy, then cutting it by propensity to buy using factors specific to the product, then cutting by sales complexity, especially in startups. As an example, he says that for a small startup JP Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley might top the first list and maybe two would survive the propensity cut. The complexity cut would remove such accounts because the startup lacks time for 120-day contract negotiations.
“I don't have enough time right now to spend 120 days negotiating a contract.”
Founders who sell to every customer size at once burn their money and then struggle to raise the next round
McMahon says technical founders often believe everyone will buy their product, so they pursue customers from JP Morgan Chase down to small startups. He says they burn the money and then have a hard time getting another round of funding. He advises deciding which customers the product's current capabilities will serve with the most value.
“They get burned, they burn the money, and then they have a really hard time getting another round of funding.”
Define the ICP by where the happiest, expanding customers are, then optimise message-market fit to win them.
Dan separates product-market fit, where customers are happy and expand, from message-market fit, where the company wins new logos. He argues most teams define their ICP by where they win, when it should be defined by where happy customers will drive future growth, and then training sellers and improving marketing to raise win rates in that segment.
“I'd argue that really what we should be doing is defining our ICPs by where we have the happiest customers that will contribute to the future growth of our business.”
G2 cannot chase all 210,000 listed products, so it is narrowing its target to focus on efficiency.
G2 listing is free and 210,000 companies are listed across about 2,000 categories, with traffic unequal across categories. Eric said the team is not large enough to chase that many prospects, so the goal is to make the target smaller. He also said BDR coverage did not match the stated priority: a BDR leader who named enterprise as the top segment had only one BDR on enterprise, ten on SMB and fifteen elsewhere.
“we don't have a team large enough to chase 210,000 prospects”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
ICP should be defined by where lifetime value is highest, not by where inbound demand is strongest or where CAC is lowest.
Mark said that the two common answers, where the most inbound demand is and where CAC is lowest, are both brutally wrong. He said ICP should be correlated with the highest LTV, meaning the customers who succeed, want to retain and buy more. He said the business should then work backward to acquire those customers profitably.
“It should be correlated to where you have the highest LTV.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
The ICP should be defined by lifetime value, not by where inbound demand comes from or what is cheapest to acquire.
Roberge says an ICP segment is one where customers see tremendous value, renew, expand and tell their friends. He notes this is sometimes not the highest inbound demand to the website and sometimes not the easiest or lowest-cost-of-acquisition segment to sell to.
“It really needs to be that the ICP is based on segments of the market where when people buy it, they see tremendous value, they renew, they expand, and they tell their friends.”
Early-stage companies often spread reps across every major city, which McMahon calls sprinkling the infield.
He says founders put one rep in each major US city instead of focusing where the ICP is. If ICP analysis is done, he says it may show the company could put three or four reps right in the Bay Area, and if that is where the ICP is, that is where the company should stay.
“They have to put one in every major city in the United States.”
Mark Roberge advises a three-tier ICP: proactively target perfect fits, accept engaged inbound from uncertain fits, and refuse poor fits even when they want to buy.
Mark reacted to Andy's comment about not turning anyone away. He frames the ICP as having an engagement dimension: a green tier of A-plus fits you build email lists for and cold-outreach, and a yellow tier you aren't sure about but will sell to if they come inbound engaged. He says Andy's stance is probably a slight exaggeration and advises against accepting everyone. Some customer types will pull you down and add noise to your roadmap for a product you didn't build for them.
“This is my perfect green where I'm going to go and proactively sell to. This is my yellow where I'm not quite sure, but if they're engaged in inbound, I'll do it.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Picture the target market as a dartboard with the ICP as the bullseye, the small subset of best-fit customers that renew, expand and grow
Dan said best-fit customers typically represent a small subset of the install base, and the ICP's purpose is to focus the organization on the accounts that will drive the business forward. He said that for demand gen teams with a $3 million budget to create great leads, the ICP typically fails them because it doesn't give them the information they need, so they end up leaning into quantity over quality.
“so your ICP is the bullseye of the dartboard.”
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Product-market fit may already exist in segments a company never targeted, so doubling down there can beat entering an adjacent market
Dan said that companies that haven't done this analysis will likely find fit in segments they never pursued. As an example, they may have organically acquired 35 to 40 customers in a segment they weren't proactively targeting that are growing at a healthy rate, being retained and giving positive NPS scores. He advised doubling down on these existing customer types rather than entering an adjacent market to find fit.
“you've organically acquired like 35, 40 customers in a segment that you haven't been proactively targeting that are growing at a very healthy rate”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Before expanding your target market, identify where product-market fit is strongest in your existing customer base
Dan said most founders who want a different ICP can't say what share of their market they have already penetrated. He suggested starting with the existing customer base and looking at customer lifetime value, retention and net revenue retention to find where fit is strongest before going to adjacent markets.
“Start by looking at your customer base and saying, you know, of our 500 customers, where do we have the strongest product market fit?”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Define your ICP by where customers get the most success and ROI, not where lead volume, lowest CAC or conversion rates are highest.
Mark Bersh argues Lauren Nemeth's ICP logic was about where people are seeing the most success and generating the biggest ROI, which he calls the value creation endgame. He says this points to product-market fit. He suggests plotting customer size against customer industry on lifetime value and customer value to decide where to scale.
“She said where people are seeing the most success.”
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Pinecone narrowed its focus to ISVs and software companies, where it sees the biggest AI workloads.
Lauren Nemeth said Pinecone stopped trying to sell to everyone, since sales teams running in 50 directions is flawed. Based on evaluations of existing customers and conversations with partners such as Anthropic, she saw interest consolidate around ISVs and software companies. She said a vector database that prides itself on scale, high throughput and data freshness needed to focus on those major workloads.
“You'll see sort of a consolidation of interest really around ISVs or software companies today”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Start validation from hypotheses about who the early adopters are, aiming for fast early traction with conviction that the segment can expand.
Mark says a founder need not try to serve every region and industry at once, and that it is rare that boiling the ocean works. He suggests picking perhaps five cohorts, seeing which respond, then rerunning the test with only the strong cohorts. He says the early goal need not be a billion dollars in revenue, only getting to a meaningful number fast with high conviction that the segment can be expanded later.
“Maybe there's five different cohorts and let's see what happens.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Define the ICP by lifetime value and retention rather than by low CAC or easy close rates.
Roberge respectfully adds to Bosworth's approach. He says teams often define ICP by close rates, CAC or inbound flow, which can produce a churny business. He says sometimes the highest-LTV accounts do not have the lowest CAC, and an ICP built on exceptional LTV segments lets you afford a higher CAC.
“sometimes the highest ltv accounts don't have the lowest cac and if we're building our icp based on where our inbound leads are coming from or where our close rates are higher you can end up with a very churny business”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Describing the ICP as software companies in marketing is too broad, and that G2 narrowed its focus to specific software categories from its taxonomy of over 2,100.
Mike said G2 had over 95,000 software companies to pick from, so each team would reach different assumptions about where to start. He said the better approach was to rank specific categories, for example category one through 2,100, to decide where to focus time and energy. He tied this to what G2 could sell and support at each package level.
“we have over 2100 categories we track. So like what's category one through category 2100”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Point solutions will be absorbed into platforms, so winning requires covering more of the workflow on shared data.
8 independent voices · 5 shows3 new this month
said Asad Zaman (Topline), Keith Peiris (Topline), Mark Roberge (The Science of Scaling), Steve Cox (Topline), Cassie Young (The Revenue Leadership Podcast, Topline), Ping Wu (Grit) and 2 more
11 sources
Asad Zaman predicts that within a year or two, companies will distill standalone products with compute, turning many standalone companies into features.
Asad's example is that a company could spend a million dollars of compute to distill a complete replica of a product like Granola. He concludes that much more product will be needed to win a category. The other hosts called the argument 'smart sounding' but wrong.
“a lot of things that are standalone companies will put on features and the amount of product you're gonna need to have. on a company to be able to win a category is going to just be that much more.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Keith Peiris predicts the sequencing and forecasting layer (the Clari/Outreach category) will probably be absorbed into the system of record because it has become commoditized.
Keith said a good sequencer can now be built in a couple of weeks, and so can good forecasting tools built with frontier models on top of great data. He still can't imagine Lightfield doing everything in revenue, because he sees that as infinite and says some companies will endure.
“So I think that that layer, the sort of Clari Outreach, that layer I think will probably be sucked into the system of record.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
High-growth companies want best-of-breed, but 'best' may come from deep, shared understanding of customers rather than having every point-tool feature.
Lightfield's ICP is high-growth tech companies, and Keith says they all want best-of-breed. He asks whether best-of-breed means every Outreach sequencer feature, or a system that understands the customer and sales process well enough to do the best agent work. His analogy is Microsoft Office: Teams and PowerPoint may not be the best individually, but shared data and directory access make the suite work.
“I think the bet that a lot of people are making now is actually if you have If you have the best modeling of your customers and your prospects, that makes those other features better than the points.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
AI makes it faster to build products for many markets, so vertical software companies should own the whole operating system, which can raise ACV in markets that were not previously VC-backable.
He points to restaurant software winners such as Toast and contractor software such as ServiceTitan, and notes that a restaurant runs more than one piece of software. He calls this a why-now argument for building new products into existing markets.
“you're better off going really deep and try to own the entire operating system, the tech stack of that business.”
Platforms that solve a single problem in the workflow will not keep customers, so the combined company needed to cover more of the workflow.
He says Clari was known for forecasting and Salesloft for engagement, and each has since expanded into the other's area. He argues that owning the workflow matters, but that a company must also be strong across all of it, not just one part.
“if you only solve one problem in the workflow you won't keep you in the room.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Classic point solutions carry the most risk in the AI era, more than DIY builds of full platforms.
Cassie Young says she is sceptical of vibe-coded DIY CRMs, which she thinks will work in mid-market and enterprise until the first major security breach. She sees extreme risk for classic point solutions, and notes that most startups begin as a point solution or wedge, so they must accelerate the product roadmap to avoid being replaced.
“where I think there's extreme risk in that category are like the classical point solutions.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Partial-platform AI tools now look more like features than companies, because full platforms make them unnecessary.
Cassie says full-platform plays are more compelling than partial-platform plays, which now feel more like features, because an end-to-end platform does the work that point tools did. Separately, she says buyers like having a throat to choke for security and governance, which makes her less worried about DIY replacing platforms. She says eight months earlier she would probably have backed a company solving one part of the problem, but now she expects buyers to adopt it for year one and then build it themselves.
“in these full platform plays versus things that even looked like partial platform plays now feel more like features”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
An AI-native CRM needs a compound startup approach to take share; Cassie sees a wedge-first path as harder.
Cassie contrasts a classical wedge play, where a company takes one clear wedge with a broad platform vision, with a compound startup approach that spans the whole customer lifecycle. She says you have to take the compound approach to take share, and that a sales-coaching company building an invisible CRM is a harder path, which is her personal conviction.
“A native CRM like you kind of have to go at it from the compound startup approach if you're really going to take share”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Cresta expanded into a multi-product platform earlier than most would, because the products share data and intelligence and make go-to-market easier.
He described the products as sharing the same data and intelligence substrate, so the AI assistant and AI agent draw on the same workflows and knowledge base. When asked about timing, he placed it in the range of 10 to 30 million dollars of ARR.
“So there's just a lot of synergy and compounding value to build a multi -product platform little early.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
A point solution is hard to win after AI because every incumbent can spin up the same feature, so a platform is needed.
He said there is too much competition for a point solution because every incumbent can build that feature, and that the sales cycle necessitates playing the platform game. He framed this as a meta observation about the post-AI market.
“you can't win as a point solution. There's too much competition. Every incumbent can spin up that feature.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Kristi suggests AI point solutions may be overtaken by embedded platforms that catch up on features, which could leave those products without a need.
She argues that point solutions focused on features are not true platforms of transformation, and that the embedded systems in organisations are innovating faster and releasing similar functionality. She says customers may then decide they already have that functionality. She says she is curious what will happen to these new products. Josh adds that some great companies will still emerge.
“they're point solutions, not platforms. The platforms are catching up.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Scattered AI experiments fail to create value, so AI work must be inventoried and tied to a few business goals.
7 independent voices · 3 shows
said Bryan Murphy (Topline), Matthew Kropp ([Un]Churned), Jason Goldsmith ([Un]Churned), Margo Martin ([Un]Churned), Cassie Young (The Revenue Leadership Podcast), Rob Edmondson ([Un]Churned) and 1 more
7 sources
Smartling organizes its AI work around four customer-outcome pillars: quality, speed, cost and ease of translation.
He said these pillars are the North Star for everything, including the product roadmap, and that every AI initiative has to link to them. He said anything that cannot show a material impact on one of them does not get off the ground in the BRD process, a discipline he learned from a mentor at eBay who asked what the change would do for the customer and whether it was material.
“So in our particular case, it's quality, speed. cost and ease of translation.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Many companies ran large numbers of AI experiments that did not create business value.
Kropp described a phase where large companies ran about a thousand AI initiatives, mostly chatbots, which got employees hands-on but did not change the business. Companies are now moving to a few big rocks, meaning three to five focused areas with a senior sponsor and an objective tied to overall corporate goals.
“But it didn't create any value.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Jason Goldsmith's first step was to pull 65 to 100 AI initiatives from three organizations into one place.
He said he had pulled these together in the week before the recording, currently in a PowerPoint, and said they need to live in a dashboard the team can share. He said he did not know what his extended team was doing with AI day to day. The aim is to spot overlap, such as people on different teams working on similar efforts, and pair them so they can combine work.
“I pulled together at least the you know the 65 to 100 initiatives that our three organizations are working on”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Margo Martin found that Deltek's three post-sale organizations were duplicating AI work because nobody had an inventory of what was being built.
Her one-on-ones with the leaders of support, customer success and professional services showed them describing the same AI builds. Directors and managers were building matching tools across the three organizations, because leaders had told everyone to learn AI and go faster. She said without someone to pull it together, the organizations would keep going down three siloed paths.
“there was no inventory of all the good AI goodness that was going on within our organization”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Letting everyone experiment with AI across many initiatives without clear owners or objectives leaves a company without focus.
Cassie Young says many organisations are trying dozens of AI initiatives without a clear owner or objectives. She compares this to the 2006 Yahoo peanut butter manifesto, where everyone spreads themselves thin across many things.
“one of the downsides of letting everybody experiment, do you know what I mean? Is you just end up without real focus.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Ironclad ties each AI agent on its roadmap to an OKR, so the team can see whether the agent moves a needle.
Rob said his team is working on an AI roadmap that prioritises which tools to build or use. He asked that any agent built be tied to an OKR, since Ironclad uses an OKR model. He said it is easy to start building agents, but the business still has to run, so the team needs to focus on the right areas.
“If we're going to build an agent, let's tie it to an OKR So we know it's, it's moving a needle somewhere”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Most AI initiatives are failing to earn ROI because companies lack a strategy for AI, not because the technology does not work.
Pablo said the MIT and McKinsey reports are both accurate, but that the technology works. He said the fundamental issue is that there has not been a strategy executed on AI, and that companies spread AI initiatives thinly across many departments and sub-departments.
“The tech works. The fundamental issue is one, there hasn't been a strategy execute on AI.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Many incumbent SaaS companies and categories will be displaced in the AI era.
6 independent voices · 3 shows3 new this month
said Ann Davis (Revenue Builders), Brad Scott (Revenue Builders), Marc Ferrentino (Topline), Sam Jacobs (Topline), Kyle Lacy (Topline), Brett Queener ([Un]Churned)
7 sources
Her company's own SaaS revenue took an AI-related hit, and that she would be surprised if other SaaS companies were not seeing one.
Ann says the hit to Crunchbase's revenue was anticipated, and the question for SaaS companies is how quickly they can define a go-forward strategy. She says those that think they are too important to lose users will face problems.
“Anyone in the SaaS software business that's not seeing a hit to their revenue from AI, I would be surprised.”
Software vendors that assume AI will not take their revenue are mistaken, and that an MCP interface is becoming the new SaaS interface.
Ann says Crunchbase took a hit to its own revenue from AI, which it had anticipated, and that she would be surprised if any SaaS business was not seeing one. She says the SaaS companies that are fine will be those attached to AI companies in some way.
“We've already got our MCP on the front end and that's the new SaaS.”
SaaS companies that are not true systems of record will be disintermediated, and some will linger as zombie companies for 10 to 15 years.
He says companies that sit across an organization as the blood and guts, rather than as systems of record, will likely have a longer and harder road and will be disintermediated by new companies. He points to Sabre, which he says still exists as a shell of its former self, as an example of how long that decline can take.
“there's going to be this long tail of these other companies”
He is less bullish on Figma and Canva because OpenAI image models now produce strong mood boards and consistent characters.
Marc says he would have said he was still very bullish because he still uses both products, but after using the latest OpenAI image models for recent content, he would answer differently. He says that unless Figma and Canva develop proprietary technology, or become the publisher of the next great image model, they face trouble, even though the products are beautifully crafted and founder-led.
“Unless they can come up with some proprietary technology, unless they are the publishers of that next great image model and not OpenAI and not Gemini, then I think there's some trouble waters ahead here because they're beautiful products.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Sam is extremely bearish on legacy SaaS-era marketing platforms run by professional managers after founders left.
Sam says these companies traded multiple times on the way to around 200 to 300 million in revenue, and founders then left and brought in professional managers with no native sense for AI. He says this leaves technical and cultural debt, and that private equity ownership makes it worse, so product innovation and vision are unlikely. He contrasts companies where the founder remains, such as Salesforce with Benioff and ZoomInfo with Henry Schuck.
“And in so doing, the founders peaced out and they brought in professional managers. And the professional managers don't have any native or intuitive sense for what's going to happen with AI for the most part.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Lessonly's playbook would not survive in 2026 because its software had no moat and could be vibe coded in a weekend.
Kyle Lacy said Lessonly in the current market would get eaten alive, because its software was simple to use and did not have a moat. He said what still works from that era is the customer-first culture and the storytelling, which were built around the customer and part of the company's culture.
“Lesson Lee in this age would get eaten alive our software did not have emote it was really simple to use you could probably vibe code it down a weekend.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
His forecast from 18 months ago that 75% of customer-facing software companies would disappear, with 50% of categories disappearing at the same time, has held up well enough to keep writing about.
Queener says he had AI agents analyze whether he was right enough to deserve writing a new piece, and the first half of that piece reviews how the moats he expected have changed over the last 18 months. He frames the prediction as a bold call he made 18 months before the episode. The claim is his own assessment of his prediction.
“I thought I was prescient like I wrote 18 months ago, that 75% of all customer facing software companies would disappear and 50% of all categories would disappear at the same time.”
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- Experimental AI spending will be cut and tech stacks consolidated, exposing AI tools with weak retention.
6 independent voices · 3 shows
said Snehal Nimje (Topline), Steve Cox (Topline), Trae Stephens (Grit), Sam Jacobs (Topline), Josh Schachter ([Un]Churned), Kristi Faltorusso ([Un]Churned)
6 sources
Leads that show interest do not necessarily create traction, so test whether customers are essential or just trying out experimental AI budgets.
Snehal said Outdoo received many leads that did not lead to attraction, and that buyers who were just using experimental AI budget did not commit later. He said the team needed customers who found the product essential, and that such customers may look like small numbers early on but compound over time.
“not just because they had some experimental AI budget and they wanted to try out few things and they just did not commit later on”
AI-native startups that grew quickly to $2-4M ARR are increasingly showing up for sale after running out of funding, and they typically struggle with retention.
Steve Cox says many AI-native companies come across his desk as acquisition targets. He describes them as having a similar profile: they went to market, grew to two, three or four million dollars of ARR quickly, and then struggled with retention after the first funding round.
“the amount of AI native companies that come across my desk now that you know are up for sale you know they've run out of funding they've done the first round and when you look at them they all have a similar profile which is you know they went to market you know they grew to two three four million of ARR pretty quickly and they've struggled with retention”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Trae Stephens predicted that enterprises will tighten their discipline on SaaS spending rather than spend exponentially more because more SaaS companies exist.
Trae Stephens said the enterprises that spend meaningful dollars on SaaS will not multiply their spend because there are more vendors. He said they will tighten up and maintain discipline, and that he feels there is a market imbalance. He described competition as the killer of opportunity in Silicon Valley and said there is more of it now than ever.
“They're not going to spend exponentially more on SaaS because there's exponentially more enterprise SaaS companies”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Sam Jacobs predicted one of Replit, Lovable or Bolt will go out of business or be acquired in 2026, and that vibe-coding platforms will face a retention reckoning.
He said these platforms' retention data may look like tools people use once and never again because there is no clear use case. He said there will be a reckoning around the term ARR, and the vibe-coding platforms will be put through the wringer.
“one of them will go out of business and shut down.”
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An 'ERR apocalypse' is coming, where experimental recurring revenue from AI tools dissolves, which he expects this year.
He attributes the term to Cassie Young and Kyle Poyar, whom he spoke to. He says companies have been playing with many AI tools as a fun playground because they see productivity gains, and that this tinkering has led to bloat. He expects consolidation to be greater than before, driven by budgets and by the tinkering itself, not only cost cutting.
“there's like this apocalypse that's going to come”
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Kristi expects a major wave of tech stack consolidation in 2026, continuing a trend she says started two years ago.
She says companies are consolidating for two reasons: to cut costs and streamline budgets, and to open budget for new software aligned with their AI initiatives. She says people are rethinking the technology they already have in front of them.
“I think you're going to see a lot of consolidation around tech stack”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Most moats are illusory in AI, so speed of execution and adaptation is the real advantage.
5 independent voices · 3 shows2 new this month
said Chase Lochmiller (The Twenty Minute VC), Harry Stebbings (The Twenty Minute VC), Josh Schachter ([Un]Churned), Brett Queener ([Un]Churned), Arvind Jain (Grit)
7 sources
He changed his mind in the past year and now believes most moats are illusory, so speed and adaptability are what create advantage.
He notes that VCs love to ask about long-term moats. He now thinks most moats are ephemeral, especially while model capabilities are advancing quickly. In his view, advantage comes from moving quickly and adapting to an ever-changing 'chessboard'.
“I think what I've changed my mind on is most moats are illusion. Most moats don't exist. Most of them are ephemeral”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Harry Stebbings largely thinks moats are bullshit, and that what matters is speed of decision-making, product execution and building value quickly.
Stebbings says he was mocked for investing in Lovable because it was 'a wrapper', and concedes it was one. He argues that wrapper companies win by building very valuable features very quickly and compounding that over time.
“it's about speed of decision -making, product execution, and building value over time very, very fast.”
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An AI-efficient engineering team that moves quickly can be a lasting competitive moat.
Josh describes a conversation with the founder and CEO of Zora, who is transforming his whole company but says engineering matters most because it keeps him ahead. Josh says this reminds him of what Ziv said about Gong: a company that stays far ahead and efficient in what it builds will keep a moat.
“if companies can stay so far ahead and be efficient with what they're building, that will continue to be a moat for them.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Traditional SaaS moats such as the system of record and accumulated context are now table stakes, a right to play rather than a right to win.
He says moats he once thought would let a company win a game have become the price of entry. He gives a basketball analogy: being fit gives you the right to play but does not win the game. He presents this as a shift he and others have experienced over the last 18 months.
“They're just table stakes. So you don't have them, you can't play, but they're not a right to win”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Jain calls speed of adaptation the new currency: how fast a company can change its product and code to use the latest technology.
He argues that quickly changing product and code gives leverage to take advantage of the latest technology as it is built. He says this matters more than ever because the pace of change is so fast. He presents it as his view of what now matters most in building software.
“So the new currency now, and well, I guess it's always been, but it's like it's more important than ever before is how fast you can adapt, change, change your product, change your code.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
For most companies, competitive differentiation is customer understanding plus software speed, and a real moat is rare
Schuck said he believes most companies, perhaps nearly all, differentiate on how well they understand the customers they build for and how quickly they can ship software those customers value. He said a few companies get a moat, usually from a network or flywheel effect or a contributory data asset where every new customer strengthens the product. He said he would invest in building a moat once there is clear conviction about how it will be created.
“And I think like for most companies, maybe all, just about all companies, your competitive differentiation, I believe, is how well do you understand the customers you're building software for?”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Strong execution is, in many cases, the only real moat a company can build.
Stevie said every investor asks what protects a business, and she is a big believer that strong execution is the only real moat that can be built in many cases. Mark partly disagreed: he said you don't always need a moat and can outpace competitors without one, but a moat is a huge advantage if you have it, and pointed to Porter's barriers to entry.
“strong execution is the only real moat that you can build in many cases.”
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- Large companies will keep their systems of record such as CRM and ERP rather than switch away from them.
4 independent voices · 4 shows1 new this month
said Brad Scott (Revenue Builders), Ghazi Masood (Topline, The Revenue Leadership Podcast, [Un]Churned), AJ Bruno (Topline), Liz Christo (Topline)
8 sources
Systems of record are hard to replace with AI, because they are wired into many departments and underpin revenue, so AI will not simply vibe-code them away.
Brad says pulling the inner workings out of products that underpin Fortune 500 revenue is incredibly painful, so he expects replacement to take much longer than the disruption thesis suggests. A host added that companies typically bought at least five packages to attach to Salesforce and wrote their own code in each department, and Brad agreed that ripping it out would kill the patient.
“everyone can't vibe code their own salesforce and those systems of record are going to be pretty sticky.”
Ghazi expects systems of record like Salesforce to stay while customers build better interfaces on top of them.
He said upmarket he is not seeing large systems of record such as ERP or core CRM being replaced, but seeing them extended with better interfaces or dashboards built on Replit. Downmarket he sees customers building their own CRM on Replit instead of buying Salesforce. Internally, Replit wants reps not to touch Salesforce, with everything built on top automating it for them.
“the systems of record are staying there but what we are seeing is we're seeing the extensibility of the systems of record”
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He does not believe anyone will switch away from their CRM, citing distribution, data and trust built with customers.
He said he remains very bearish on companies switching away from systems like Salesforce or CRM, even as switching between AI models is easy. He said he does not believe customers will switch CRM systems, citing distribution, data and the trust companies have built with their customer base. He said he is not seeing switching happen in practice.
“I don't believe anyone's going to be switching CRM”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
For a large enterprise, rebuilding the integrations to billing, finance and back office is a major cost, even if a custom build is technically possible.
Ghazi said that at a large enterprise, billing, finance, accounting, true-ups and delinquencies are tightly integrated with the front office, so a vibe-coded replacement would require rebuilding all of that plumbing. He said it could be done, but the question is whether to invest that time, and he sees it as a large uplift for organizations that have run for decades. Kyle added governance, security and stability as further heuristics for buying.
“if you're a big enterprise organization like that, you're not building your own CRM.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Replit keeps Salesforce as its system of record and builds its revenue workflows as internal apps on top of it.
Ghazi said Replit moved from HubSpot to Salesforce and decided not to build its own CRM. On top of Salesforce, the revenue team uses internally built Replit apps such as a revenue co-pilot dashboard, customer health, CPQ and forecasting, and he said the extensibility is what matters.
“Salesforce is our system of record.”
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A system of record is a utility that does not need to delight users, so a delightful AI-native alternative may be aimed at a different use case.
AJ Bruno says the delightful alternative Asad Zaman described and a system of record are very different use cases. He says a database is not set up to delight anyone, and that is acceptable because a system of record simply does what it needs to do. He says he does not want a Replit version of his CRM.
“And the delight, I'm not sure a database is ever set up to delight anyone. And that's, and that's okay. It's a system of record.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Liz still believes in the system of record, arguing that AI can strengthen one and help it build a deeper moat.
Liz says she still believes in the system of record, and acknowledges that people waffle back and forth on this debate. She says a company that is a system of record can be strengthened by AI and build a deeper moat.
“if you are a system of record you could be excuse me strengthened by AI and actually build like a deeper mode”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Ghazi's personal view is that large enterprises will keep their systems of record such as ERP and CRM and build dashboards on top of them.
He says large enterprises are too big and have too much invested to get rid of their ERP or Salesforce-type systems. He says he sees a lot of wrappers and additional capability built on platforms like Replit to make those systems more agile, with separate dashboards pulling data from Salesforce and other systems.
“You're not going to go get rid of their ERP system or their, you know, their sales force system or their CRM system.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- The ICP should be a living scoring model refreshed continuously, not an annual exercise.
4 independent voices · 3 shows
said Tim Rutten (The Revenue Leadership Podcast), Alex Varel (Revenue Builders), Adrian Rosenkranz (The Revenue Leadership Podcast), Mark Roberge (Topline)
5 sources
The ICP should be a systematised scoring model with qualifiers, disqualifiers and dissatisfiers, updated as the market changes.
He treats the ICP as parameters against which an account can be scored, informed by deals won and lost, and refined about monthly. Examples of disqualifiers include an account that has just bought a competing vendor, or a mid-tier bank just announced for acquisition. Backbase retuned its ICP after acquiring Casisto, an agentic conversational banking company.
“So an ICP to me is nothing more than a set of parameters against which you can score an account.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Treat the ICP as a live input updated from capital flow and funding signals rather than an annual exercise.
Alex says his team tracks the flow of capital and raises, pulls data from multiple sources, synthesizes it, and constantly updates top target lists. Scoring and market signals move accounts into tier one, which takes most seller time, and so change how sellers prioritize their pipeline cadence.
“We're tracking the flow of capital. We're tracking raises.”
Webflow regenerates its ICP each week as a markdown file from calls, Slack and messaging, so the team can track drift over time.
Adrian said the job combines Webflow's messaging and positioning doc, historical customer call transcripts and Slack activity, plus frameworks he borrowed from others. The output includes anti-ICP patterns, ICP patterns, customer quotes and jobs-to-be-done, and other agents use it. He can compare this week's file with last week's and look back a month.
“And so it's on a cron job. And so every week it just makes a new file and you can see the drift from the previous one.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
The best organizations recalculated ICP about once a quarter, and AI could make that continuous across many attributes.
Mark said the best organizations today may have had their ops team re-run ICP once a quarter using four or five segment attributes. He said AI could allow this to happen hourly across an effectively unlimited number of attributes. He said ICP can shrink because of new competition or economic conditions, or expand because of product releases.
“We can do it hourly on an infinite number of attributes.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Snowflake's early ideal customer profile was tech and ad tech companies, and the profile should be updated as the product's differentiators change.
John says Snowflake could initially only sell to tech and ad tech companies. As feedback shaped the product and new differentiators solved other pains and use cases, he says the ideal customer profile was continually updated.
“What we found initially is that we could only go to tech companies and add tech companies.”
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- Incumbents moving to AI must commit fully to the new product even at the cost of near-term numbers.
3 independent voices · 2 shows
said Asad Zaman (Topline), Jaleh Rezaei (Topline), Kellie Snyder ([Un]Churned), Sam Jacobs (Topline)
6 sources
Asad Zaman relays a Benchmark view that every day a SaaS company hits its revenue targets, it destroys enterprise equity value.
Asad Zaman attributes this to Eric from Benchmark and says it describes the problem SaaS companies face when hitting their numbers keeps them from changing. He says the bigger the company, the harder it is to burn down the existing model. The view is that most SaaS companies run AI work from five to eight after their core business from nine to five, when they should work the other way.
“every day that you are hitting your revenue targets as a SaaS company, you're destroying enterprise equity value.”
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Mutiny ran both businesses for about three quarters before deciding to deprecate the existing product in November 2025.
Jaleh described trying several playbooks, including having sales sell only the new product and making the company more founder-led, and judging each by whether the company was moving as fast as possible. She said the team did not feel it could move that fast while splitting focus, so it spent about three quarters on trials before the November 2025 decision.
“so that took about three quarters. And then I say the last quarter was when I started to come to the decision and we rolled it out. So November of 2025 is when we made the decision to fully deprecate the existing product.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Running a zero-to-one AI build and a scaled SaaS business at the same time was impossible for Mutiny because they require opposite leadership styles.
Mutiny initially planned for its existing SaaS business to fund the AI build. Jaleh said the zero-to-one phase is a benevolent dictatorship, while a scaled business depends on delegation, autonomy, goals and OKRs, and the two modes conflicted. She said the team was surprised when the CEO started making all the calls and sometimes pivoting on decisions already made, which is really bad to do in a scaling phase.
“The zero to one journey is a benevolent dictatorship. And running a scale business is all about delegating and autonomy and giving people goals and OKRs and planning and things like that.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
LinkSquares made the decision to re-platform its contract management product rather than keep waiting, which Kellie said many tech companies struggle with or delay too long.
Kellie said the decision was made before she joined about eight months ago, and the rebuild took two years of development. The new platform is fully agentic, so the AI does the work on a customer's contract assets rather than only managing files and workflows. She framed the choice as a bet that the company needed to rethink its solution space.
“they made the tough decision, right, which a lot of tech companies have a struggle with, or they wait. way too long right”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Pursuing something entirely different may mean accepting lower numbers in the short term.
Sam Jacobs links the Intercom pivot to the innovator's dilemma. He says a company has to be willing to go after a new direction even if reported numbers fall, and that the payoff may show up in a later year's story rather than the current one.
“even if my numbers go down in the short term”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Intercom gave up about $60 million of contracted seat-based ARR and moved all its marketing and staffing behind Fin.
Sam Jacobs says Intercom gave up about $60 million of contracted seat-based ARR to back Fin. The company moved its marketing and energy to Fin and staffed the team building it, which he describes as pivoting the whole organisation rather than a single product.
“I think he said he gave up 60 million of contracted seat based ARR. They moved all of their marketing, every bit of energy, they staffed the team that was working on Fin.”
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- Compounding cash flow and becoming default alive beat chasing growth at all costs, especially for VC-backed companies not growing at AI rates.
4 independent voices · 3 shows
said Michael Walrath (Topline), Karri Saarinen (Grit), Sam Jacobs (Topline), Mark Roberge (The Science of Scaling)
6 sources
Compounding cash flow beats chasing high growth over the long run, unless high-growth companies themselves become compounders.
He pointed to roughly a century of market history and to operators such as Berkshire Hathaway and Liberty Media. He said a business can grow only 5 to 10% a year organically and still generate a lot of cash flow, which funds further growth. He framed compounding as the source of most value creation.
“if you compound effectively, you will out return these super high growth stories, unless those super high growth stories eventually become compounders.”
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Linear's stated priority is long-term survival over maximising momentum or speed.
Karri Saarinen says Linear has valued staying alive as long as possible higher than increasing momentum or speed, and compares the approach to founders who play high-stakes games. He says the company reached default alive within two years of starting, never really spent the money it raised, and grew profit each year even while spending more. He says it was never a goal to maximise profit, and that the company can control its own destiny without worrying about the next fundraise.
“we kind of like valuing that in some ways higher than like just. increasing the momentum or the speed”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Sam Jacobs described a craft business that is built to last decades and focused on customer experience, and which must be profitable.
Sam said the alternative to the fast growth model is a company intended to last 20, 30 or 40 years, with a machine designed to generate predictable cash while meeting a high standard of taste. He said he is building this kind of company himself.
“There's a different way to build a company that is a craft business.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
VC-funded SaaS companies not growing at AI rates are out of choices and should aim to become cash-flow positive.
Sam said SaaS companies in the middle, growing 30 to 50%, need a path out. That path is to become cash-flow positive and, whether or not they are valued at 10 to 15 times ARR, build a cash flow stream that could be paid back to shareholders, making the business more like a regular business.
“You're out of choices if you're not growing at AI rates.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
VC-backed startups that are clearly not going to blitzscale should redesign their go-to-market system around Rule of 40 instead of keeping the grow-at-all-costs playbook.
Roberge says venture funding brings an expectation of a blitzscale plan. Two to four years in, he says, it works out about 10% of the time and fails about 90% of the time. The problem is that founders don't change the go-to-market system design even when it's clear they won't be a $10B company. He claims that switching to Rule of 40 to become default alive gives a better than 50% shot at returning hundreds of millions of dollars to founders, employees and investors, or at getting back on the unicorn track, and cites Henry at ZoomInfo as an example.
“Even though it's very clear that we're not a blitz scale, that we're not a grow all cost, that we're not going to be a $10 billion company, we still apply the same go -to -market system design and approach. Wrong. We got to shift.”
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A business with low equity value but high cash flow can be a viable alternative to a venture-backed path
Schuck described a hypothetical 25 to 50 million dollar staffing firm with a 40 to 50 percent cash flow margin, which he said would produce about 12 million dollars a year in cash flow on a 25 million dollar business. He said he was 100 percent sure he could build one, and argued that this avoids the rat race of VC-backed competitors constantly trying to disrupt your business.
“then just build a business that has low equity value, but high cash flow value.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Marketing, sales and customer success should be unified under one leader or function rather than run as separate silos.
4 independent voices · 3 shows1 new this month
said Jeanne DeWitt Grosser (Grit), Amanda Kahlow (Topline), Brad Casemore ([Un]Churned), Jo Massie ([Un]Churned)
4 sources
Marketing, sales and support should report to one leader because the human customer experience is a product in itself.
She said it is common for these functions to roll up to three separate leaders, which produces overlapping strategies rather than one integrated experience. She has repeatedly seen support and sales use different segmentations, which she considers unworkable, and has seen marketing spend misaligned with where sales puts people. Owning all of it makes aligning them her problem.
“one of the things companies don't nail is the human-based customer experience is a product just like the actual product.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Marketing, sales and customer success will collapse into one go-to-market function within about 12 months, with humans managing outcomes.
Amanda Kahlow believes the go-to-market functions held in silos will collapse together within roughly 12 months. In her picture AI handles research, communication, onboarding and building for customers, while humans manage first touch through close, renewal and upsell and act as a checkpoint on outcomes. She presents this as her belief about where the roles are heading.
“in 12 months from now, I truly believe there will be a collapse of like the go -to -market functions and silos, like marketing, sales, customer success, they're all gonna collapse together.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Combining the CCO and CGO roles makes sense because customer value and revenue growth are one motion.
He reasons that growth comes when a company delivers on value for its customers, so the whole customer lifecycle should be mapped across the organization and people aligned to it. At PartsSource he has taken on the growth side of the role over the last nine months, with the aim that everything done pre-sales aligns with onboarding and retention after the sale.
“growth really comes when you deliver on value for your customers.”
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Slido put marketing, customer success and most of sales under one customer remit because digital and marketing have become closely intertwined.
Jo Massie said she owns everything customer, including marketing, customer success and about 90% of sales. Her reasoning was that digital and marketing overlap heavily, and that product usage drives customer acquisition, so the functions fit together. She said the combined digital team can now operate much faster than when its work was split across teams.
“At some point digital and marketing become very closely intertwined.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Software vendors should shift from selling tools to delivering outcomes as AI-native services, or the seat-based model will depreciate.
4 independent voices · 2 shows1 new this month
said AJ Bruno ([Un]Churned), Jake Saper ([Un]Churned), Chuck Ganapathi ([Un]Churned), Asad Zaman (Topline)
5 sources
AJ Bruno predicts that seat-based SaaS tools that don't move to AI-native services will be forgotten, and that each category will have only one winner.
AJ Bruno says QuotaPath has no choice: without this move it becomes a forgotten SaaS tool, and SaaS tools are not even getting 1x multiples right now. He wants QuotaPath to become the premier AI-native services company, creating a category the way Gainsight once did. He sees Gainsight and QuotaPath as non-competitive allies in getting buyers to accept the new model, and says the old SaaS mentality must change for companies to survive.
“if we do not make this move, we will be a forgotten SaaS. Tool like everyone else and no one no one cares and you're not even getting 1x multiples on SaaS tools right now”
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Software vendors may need to shift from selling tools to selling outcomes because AI can now do much of the work itself.
He frames software as a means to an end, like the wheel, and says selling a tool makes less sense when AI does the work. He puts it as wanting to sell the fish rather than the fish pole.
“We're now in a world where AI can do much of the work itself. And so selling a tool doesn't make as much sense anymore.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Chuck Ganapathi predicts that delivering outcomes through AI agents, not just software, will be the future of software.
Chuck Ganapathi says the role of agentic software should be to deliver the customer's outcome, not to hand the technology to customers to execute. He says Gainsight launched Atlas, an AI-native renewals service that it sells as a managed service, and that Gainsight is no longer just selling software.
“We believe that's going to be the future of software.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Vendors that only sell software struggle to prove ROI because the customer has to own and deliver the outcome.
Chuck Ganapathi says that in SaaS the ROI from a project has to be owned and delivered by the customer, and the vendor only supplies the software. He says most software companies have always found it hard to prove their product, and that this is why Gainsight is moving into services that deliver outcomes.
“the ROI has to be owned and delivered by the customer themselves”
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Asad Zaman predicts the old SaaS business model will become a depreciating asset over the next decade or two.
Asad Zaman contrasts the move with trading one house for another, where the old house still exists. Here, he says, the better SaaS model will not remain an option and will depreciate over the next couple of decades, if not within the next decade. That makes the harder agentic model possibly the only game in town. Sam Jacobs agrees.
“it's going to be a depreciating asset over the next couple of decades, if not just within the next decade”
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- Developer and API usage of AI models has little loyalty and switches quickly to newer or cheaper models.
3 independent voices · 3 shows1 new this month
said Dev Ittycheria (The Twenty Minute VC), Anastasios Angelopoulos (Grit), Tomasz Tunguz (Topline)
4 sources
Developer buyers show little loyalty and switch quickly to new tools or run several at once.
Drawing on 12+ years selling MongoDB to developers, Dev Ittycheria said developers are quick to jump to the 'shiny new toy'. He used this to explain teams shifting meaningful usage from Anthropic to OpenAI's Codex. He framed the open question as what Anthropic ships next and what alternatives emerge.
“having sold to developers the last 12 plus years is that there's not a lot of loyalty. Developers are very quick to use to switch from one tool to another or frankly use multiple tools”
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Angelopoulos is long on OpenAI's consumer ads marketplace, arguing that only ads and great hardware businesses have shown they can generate hundreds of billions in annual revenue.
Asked what he is long and short on, he said he is short on API lock-in and long on OpenAI's consumer ads opportunity, which he says has not been fully used yet. His reasoning is that labs need hundreds of billions in annualized revenue, and he only knows of ads and great hardware as businesses that reach that scale. He believes OpenAI's consumer business may keep it afloat whatever happens at the API layer.
“one thing I'm long is the consumer ads marketplace on OpenAI which has obviously not been fully utilized to this day, but I think remains one of the biggest opportunities in AI”
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API revenue at model labs may be far less sticky than the market assumes, because customers spending heavily can switch vendors when a cheaper model arrives.
Angelopoulos says Anthropic's API revenue has been booming but is 'easy come, easy go': anyone spending that much money that fast is able to switch vendors. He calls it 'totally feasible' that within the next couple of years an open-source model does 90% of the work at 10% of the cost, and that some businesses could have all their needs met by a 'mini lite' version of the next Kimi. He calls this a structural problem for the labs.
“People are assuming a degree of lock in the APIs that I don't think is necessarily going to exist. Anthropic revenue has been booming, booming, booming on the API. But to some extent it's also easy come, easy go.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
A model company may have about 41 days to commercialize a state-of-the-art release before it is overtaken.
Tunguz said that when a model company releases a state-of-the-art model, it has about 41 days to commercialize it before it is knocked off the top. He said individual users can be kept for a while, but they will move on to the next model. He framed this as the current state of the art rather than a fixed rule.
“And so that's kind of the state of the art today. You literally have 41 days.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Proprietary datasets gain value in the AI era because they can be newly analysed, licensed or acquired for agents.
3 independent voices · 2 shows2 new this month
said Ann Davis (Revenue Builders), Katie Bullard (Topline), Sam Jacobs (Topline)
4 sources
Software vendors can license their data within the application to create a second revenue stream as their user counts decline.
Ann says a software company with valuable data can license that data to enterprises for their AI front ends, so revenue from data may rise even as seat-based software revenue falls. She says this is the strategy vendors should be working out now.
“You can have a way to license the data within that software application and have another revenue stream.”
To avoid being reduced to a system of record, a data provider should build proprietary datasets competitors cannot replicate and expand its data distribution partnerships.
Ann says Crunchbase recognised before she joined that AI would likely take a large part of its business, so it prioritised datasets that competitors could not copy. She says the second part is supporting the new solutions being built on top of its data through a data distribution partnership strategy.
“the best way to do that is to develop proprietary data sets that they can't replicate.”
Zscaler's interest in Red Canary centred on the value of its data asset for future AI agents more than on agents already in the product.
She describes Red Canary as a data business, like ZoomInfo or DiscoverOrg, whose differentiator was how it ingested and normalised data to build predictive models before agents existed in the software. The deal was announced at the end of May and closed in August, and she says AI changed a great deal in the year after.
“more of the value the potential for AI agents based on this unique data asset that we had”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
A 15-year-old data business with $220 million in ARR is accelerating and heading toward $300 million because AI lets it analyse data it already held.
Sam Jacobs describes a call with the president of this business. He says it is growing faster than last year and is on track to reach $300 million, which he attributes to AI analysis of datasets it previously could not analyse effectively.
“AI has given them the ability to analyze data sets that they previously had access to, but had no ability to effectively analyze.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Some startups, especially in AI, are choosing to sell to enterprise from early on rather than starting downmarket.
3 independent voices · 3 shows1 new this month
said Matt Allison (Topline), Bret Taylor (Grit), Mark Roberge (The Science of Scaling)
3 sources
Handraise is selling to enterprise from day one, aiming to command $30K+ checks from large companies.
Matt said the core problem is building a product well positioned for enterprise accounts, selling to them from the start, and building something valuable enough to command a $30K-plus check. He contrasted this with TrendKite, which sold many small deals and ended up with customers whose businesses and demands differed from enterprise companies. He described it as a deliberate choice to skip the SMB trap.
“how do we sell to those enterprise accounts day one and build something that's valuable enough where, you know, we can demand a, or command like a, you know, 30k plus check from those types of companies?”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Sierra started at the top end of the market by targeting the largest companies, and over a quarter of its customers have more than $10 billion in revenue.
Bret Taylor said the company's thesis was that a lot of its impact on the economy and the world would come through the largest companies, so it set the Fortune 100 as its ideal customer profile. He said serving these companies requires people who understand legacy systems, mainframes and regulation, which is why parts of the business were staffed with experienced people. He called starting at the top of the market very intentional and said it is unusual for a company that has been in the market for two years.
“we started kind of at the top end of the market, which was very intentional.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Mark Roberge, who has long warned founders against going enterprise too early, now suggests native AI companies may need to reach the enterprise sooner.
Mark says founders traditionally jumped to the enterprise too soon. They assumed a big logo would bring others, underestimated how long a million-dollar deal with Goldman Sachs takes, and ran out of cash first. He pushed them toward smaller companies, partly because you can't walk into Goldman Sachs with a buggy first product. He says that is still somewhat true, but that 'maybe' going to the enterprise sooner is the answer in AI, a pattern he sees at Writer.
“But eventually you go to the enterprise, maybe you go there sooner, and that becomes the answer.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Going deep in specific verticals beats building horizontal software.
4 independent voices · 4 shows2 new this month
said Manny Medina (Topline), Harry Stebbings (The Twenty Minute VC), Jean de Villiers ([Un]Churned), Aman Narang (Grit)
5 sources
Manny Medina expects many hyper-verticalized agent companies to be modest in size but very profitable, like Veeva in pharma.
Manny sees agent companies solving very narrow problems in very narrow industries. He argues that owning the whole niche makes them very profitable even if they aren't huge. He cites Veeva, which does a few things only for pharmaceuticals and turned out to be a huge business.
“So they're solving very narrow problems in very narrow industries.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Harry Stebbings is skeptical that OpenAI can win legal with a general model, because big law firms need deep, practice-specific functionality and buy through multi-year sales cycles.
Responding to OpenAI's announced product for law, Stebbings calls it 'complete bullshit', citing the very deep functionality needed to serve the largest law firms. He also points to multi-year sales cycles with partnerships. Mashrabov replies that general tools for internal teams outside law firms are definitely happening, and both cite Solve Intelligence as a specialized winner.
“if you want to sell into these law firms, it's a multi -year sales cycle”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Unit4 focuses on the mid-market and four verticals, and says it rarely competes with SAP or Workday.
Jean said the company serves not-for-profits, local government, professional services and higher education, and generally avoids large enterprise deals. He said Unit4 rarely bumps into SAP or Workday, except sometimes in North America. He said this focus makes customers stick because they can do interesting things on the platform.
“we focus on the mid -market. We don't really play in the enterprise space.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
The future of software for local businesses is vertical rather than horizontal.
Aman said Toast's view is that the future is vertical, and that for each sub-vertical the company builds capabilities brick by brick. He said that however much innovation sits on top, operational complexity and workflows must be solved first. He used grocery stores, bottle shops and other retail categories as examples.
“we believe the future is like vertical. It's not horizontal.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Toast chose to go deep on restaurants and serve every restaurant type rather than build a horizontal product.
Aman said the early customers included food trucks, cafes, quick-serve, full-service, fine dining, a bar and a nightclub, and Toast built for those edge cases on purpose. He described the company's branding as built around the thousand little things that make restaurant tech what it is. Aman presented this as a deliberate strategy, not a lack of focus.
“And I think that was a deliberate strategy.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Companies should avoid depending on a single LLM vendor.
4 independent voices · 3 shows
said Anastasios Angelopoulos (Grit), Josh Schachter ([Un]Churned), Justin Shriber (Topline), Sam Jacobs (Topline)
4 sources
Arena plans to bring its evaluation flywheel into enterprises so companies can pick models, make cost/performance trade-offs and avoid vendor lock-in.
Angelopoulos says much of the company's future is putting 'an arena' inside every business. Companies would use their own organic usage traces to learn which models are best for their users and employees, measuring whether people get jobs done and CSAT-type satisfaction. He says buyers don't know how to define performance, which is 'very mushy' and not like CPU benchmarking. The data would also power company-specific routers for vendor independence and AI sovereignty.
“People don't know how to make the trade offs in performance and costs. They don't even know how to define performance right.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Gainsight should build best-in-class MCP integrations and also keep similar features inside its own platform
Josh says Gainsight's strategy is to meet people where they are and build the best-in-class MCP, but not forget the value of having a similar feature set and rich functionality within its own platforms. Otherwise, he says, everyone is completely beholden to the group of AI players behind the LLMs.
“we got to kind of do both we gotta meet people where they are and build the best in class best in the world mcp but not forget that there is a value to having a similar feature set and rich functionality within our own platforms”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Justin advises companies not to tether themselves to one LLM or one data structure while the infrastructure is still fluid.
He described the next couple of years as an infrastructure-build period in which a technology bet could become obsolete within a month or two, so he said flexibility matters most. He said companies with the internal skills to manage this can reasonably build, while others can buy and build their own agents on top of a vendor platform.
“Don't tether yourself to one LLM. Don't tether yourself to one particular data structure.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Relying on one model vendor creates key-man risk.
He cited Anthropic having to pull Fable, calling it Mythos, and the emotional maturity of leaders like Dario and Sam Altman as reasons for concern. He said doing everything with Claude makes him nervous, and that specialisation gives a comparative advantage, so he expects better applications from focused vendors.
“feels like a lot of key man risk for one specific vendor.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Customer discovery should test how essential the product is and what buyers would pay, not ask soft 'would you use this' questions.
3 independent voices · 3 shows2 new this month
said Dan Lee (The Science of Scaling), Jesse Zhang (Grit), Snehal Nimje (Topline)
3 sources
Be paranoid about the value you deliver, and test whether you are a need-to-have rather than a nice-to-have
Dan Lee said that if he could go back to the start he would be paranoid about how much value Nooks delivers to customers, and rigorous about the mechanism for telling a nice-to-have from a need-to-have. When host Mark River noted the false-positive risk because people tell you what you want to hear, Dan recommended The Mom Test.
“I think be paranoid about how much value you're delivering to customers.”
Decagon got through the idea maze in about three weeks by running founder discovery like an aggressive sales cycle.
Avoiding a long idea maze was an explicit goal at founding. Zhang says most founders shy away from being aggressive because it feels too salesy, and default to soft questions like 'would you use this?' Instead, he and Ashwin asked how much the buyer would pay, where the budget would come from, how ROI is justified internally and who is involved. Zhang acknowledges luck played a part.
“they'll appreciate if you're asking more tough questions, like how much we pay for this, where's the budget coming from, like how do you justify ROI internally, like who are the people involved?”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Use feedback from champions to test how essential your product is, by asking how big a problem you solve and whether customers could do without it.
Snehal said Outdoo's best customers were those whose champions gave feedback on regular calls, about every two weeks. The team asked these customers how big a problem they were solving and whether they could do without the product. Those conversations revealed that finance and insurance use cases were where the product was most essential.
“is the a product really really essential can you not do without our product right”
- As models get cheaper and commoditise, value will accrue to application-layer companies.
3 independent voices · 2 shows
said Mamoon Hamid (Grit), Sam Jacobs (Topline), Gaurav Agarwal (Topline)
3 sources
Cheaper, better models will mainly benefit application-layer companies, and calling them 'wrappers' is lazy.
Joubin Mirzadegan asked whether value moves up the stack if open source cuts app companies' cost to serve by 80-90% and fixes their gross margin problem. Hamid said that has been the firm's fundamental belief. He pointed to demand at Harvey 'going through the roof' and argued that in every industry cycle, big companies buy from vendors that package a complete solution and show up to implement it and deliver value to end users.
“I know they were called wrappers for a very long period of time and I think that's, it's always the, you know, the very lazy way of, you know, identifying these companies”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
The banks' AI success comes from application-layer vendors that know the customer, not from banks building their own tools.
Sam said banks are not vibe coding their own customer support or operations software. He said the value sits in an application layer that understands the customer and sets the guardrails, so that the model is only used where reasoning is acceptable. He called this a template for vertical software in other industries.
“They're not building their own. They're not vibe coding their own internal customer support software.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Value will accrue more to the application layer than to the model layer if models commoditise.
He compared models to electricity that is priced by time and access, with orchestration in the application layer doing computation to reduce cost and deliver value. He said the exception is if one model pulls far ahead, which he expects to find out next year.
“So I do think value goes to the application layer significantly more than the model layer.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- AI lets services businesses reach high, software-like gross margins, unlike labor-based outsourcing.
3 independent voices · 2 shows
said Jake Saper ([Un]Churned), AJ Bruno (Topline), Chuck Ganapathi ([Un]Churned)
3 sources
SaaS operators have been trained to see services as the forbidden word, and that AI may let services carry high gross margins for the first time.
He notes that software's high gross margins and multiples have been tied to market, margins and recurrence, and that professional services in SaaS exist to deploy the software product. He says the core of the AINS thesis is that AI will enable services at high gross margin, which makes them venture-backable.
“the core underpinning of the AINS thesis is that AI will enable us to deliver services at a high gross margin for the first time.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
QuotaPath is betting on AI-enabled services at above 70% margin as its main growth engine for 2027.
He says the offering has two design partners and will not launch until the fall, and it is not part of the 2026 revenue plan. He says it must be profitable from day one, and the 70% figure is above the roughly 50% he heard from other services leaders as typical.
“I think that the number, the real number there is actually above 70 % margin.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
AI-enabled services differ from traditional outsourcing because they create value through humans and agents rather than labour arbitrage.
Chuck Ganapathi says services have always been a low-margin business when all the work is done by humans, and that BPO companies have long done outsourced work. He says what is different now is that Gainsight's services combine humans and agents in value creation, which a traditional outsourcing company cannot match.
“what we're doing is not labor arbitrage”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Proprietary data from usage feedback loops is the most durable AI-era moat.
4 independent voices · 3 shows2 new this month
said Dev Ittycheria (The Twenty Minute VC), Ann Davis (Revenue Builders), Gaurav Agarwal (Topline), Liz Christo (Topline)
4 sources
Dev Ittycheria splits AI apps into 'features masking as companies', which will sell, and franchises built on proprietary data loops.
Dev Ittycheria said a clever product on someone else's platform is frankly a feature, and he expects many such AI app companies to sell to larger companies for their distribution. Durable companies create a loop: usage generates data no one else has, that data improves the product, and the product attracts more usage. Competitors can then copy features but not interactions.
“are you building a feature that's masking as a company or a franchise, right?”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Crunchbase's competitive position rests on its private-market dataset plus visibility into how its users interact with the software.
Ann says Crunchbase has more private-market data from inception through Series K than anyone, covering company profiles, competitors, investors and funding rounds. She adds that its 80 million-plus software users give the company behavioural signals that others cannot access, which lets it judge whether a company is gaining or losing momentum.
“having all this data and our 80 million plus users of the software and being able to watch their digital body language that nobody else has access to”
Gaurav predicted that the companies that own the user relationship will win in the near to mid term, because they can build feedback loops to train models.
He said that at some point there will be limited training data available and models will peak, so whoever owns the user can use their interactions to improve models. He described this as the near-term winner, with a more uncertain outcome if AGI arrives.
“whoever owns the user will be able to build feedback loops to train their models better.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Proprietary data is the first durable moat Liz names, either held already or built over time by a system of action.
Liz says proprietary data is definitely the first durable advantage. A company may already have that data, or it may be a system of action that captures data and accumulates it over time. She says she still thinks this is real.
“Proprietary data is definitely the first one.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Unexpected customer demand outside the plan should be embraced because it can reveal bigger markets.
3 independent voices · 3 shows
said Brad Casemore ([Un]Churned), Lou Shipley (Revenue Builders), Ed Calnan (The Science of Scaling)
4 sources
He prefers to take on new problems customers raise rather than turn them down.
He describes telling his teams that there are two options when a market or customer need falls outside the current offering: solve it and be stretched to think differently, or say no and lose the business along with the opportunity to learn. He says post-sales organizations sometimes get frustrated when new work is requested, and he has been open to it throughout his CCO tenure.
“there's two options. Either we have the problem or like, and I'm happy to have it to be able to solve it, to stretch us to think differently, or we could have said no”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Repositioning Black Duck around open source security came from asking a customer why it used the product
Shipley says JPMorgan asked staff to hand-curate a list of open source security vulnerabilities across 10,000 applications, a list that was growing daily. When he asked why they used the product, he learned they were not looking for license compliance but for security. He repositioned the company around open source security, which he described as a much bigger market with faster growth, although some staff did not want to change.
“So we completely repositioned the company around open source security, which is a much bigger market, faster growth”
Talk to prospects whose use cases do not match your plan, because the product may end up serving a use case you did not foresee.
Ed said Seismic started as a document automation platform that went on to define the sales enablement category, a term the founders had not heard until Forrester asked to cover them. He advised founders to qualify in and out quickly and to talk to companies whose use cases do not fit the picture in their heads. When Forrester came, he worried the sales enablement TAM might not be big enough, because the product was much broader.
“I think you also should think through the use cases that you have in mind and go have some conversations that don't necessarily fit what you have in your head because that's what happened to us.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Inbound demand from LLCs made up about 10 percent of Carta's business at one point and eventually became a separate business unit.
Jeff Perry said that about 10% of the business was coming from LLCs, and at first Carta was not sure it could help them with ownership tracking but decided not to turn them away. Over time the demand became Carta's third business unit, built entirely around the LLC signal, and he noted private equity had also become influential in that area.
“during that time period, about 10% of our business was coming from LLCs, not just venture-backed C-corp companies.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Product-led growth fails when end users lack the budget, permissions or link to the economic buyer needed for bottom-up adoption.
2 independent voices · 2 shows2 new this month
said AJ Bruno ([Un]Churned), Dan Lee (The Science of Scaling)
2 sources
Product-led growth failed for commissions software because the data is sensitive and reps, CROs and RevOps are too disconnected for bottom-up adoption to travel upward.
QuotaPath started as a PLG company expecting reps to adopt it as a personal 'shadow accounting' calculator, share it with their team, and build conviction up to managers and finance. AJ Bruno says those levels turned out to be disconnected: the CRO just wants reps paid correctly and sees it as a distraction, while RevOps handles the plumbing and thinks about cost. He describes a translation problem across all three, and says PLG also kept QuotaPath down market with smaller customers whose use cases it wasn't yet fully handling.
“Well, it turns out those two are actually pretty disconnected. You have the CRO who's like, I just want my team to get paid correctly. It's a distraction.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Product-led growth did not fit selling to sales teams because reps lack software permissions and budget
Dan Lee contrasted Cursor, where engineers have budget and access to connect their tools, with sales reps who lack permission to connect Salesforce and have no discretionary budget. He said sales managers may also object when reps use many different tools, so the product-led motion made less sense for Nooks.
“whereas sales reps don't have permission to connect Salesforce uh and they don't have discretionary budget”
- When all competitors gain the same AI efficiency, they will reinvest it to grow output rather than pocket it as cost savings.
2 independent voices · 2 shows
said Kyle Norton (The Revenue Leadership Podcast), Bret Taylor (Grit)
2 sources
If competitors gain the same efficiency from AI, they will ship more with more people rather than the same output with fewer.
Kyle Norton argues that efficiency gains are not simply pocketed as cost savings, because competitive pressure changes the outcome. He says that if rivals become equally more effective they will use the gain to expand output, and his own team is growing faster because its CAC payback pencils out.
“They're going to ship more with more people.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
If every competitor has the same AI technology, companies will reinvest the efficiency gains to compete rather than pass them on as savings.
Bret Taylor said the question is whether having more people enables a company to gain more market share than its competitors. He said efficiency gains are not simply recouped as cost savings or passed to shareholders, because rivals have the same technology. He used US mobile carriers as an example: if one lowers prices the others must follow, and if one finds a new acquisition channel the others will too.
“everyone's going to absorb the impacts of the technology and then compete.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Match competitors at parity on table-stakes basics and concentrate investment on a few true differentiators.
2 independent voices · 2 shows
said Dr. Chuck Bamford (Revenue Builders), Amanda Kahlow (Topline)
4 sources
A differentiator is not rare if more than one competitor does it as well as you.
Chuck's rule of thumb is that if only one other company does something as well, it is still relatively rare, but if more than one does, it is orthodox. Orthodox things should be done well but not better than others, and the team should put its money, time and attention into the true separators.
“my rule of thumb is if one other company is doing it just as good as me, still pretty rare, but if more than one is, then it's orthodox.”
Table-stakes capabilities need to sit at roughly the competitive median before differentiators can separate you.
Chuck says a company that is below its competitors on basics like billing, invoicing and responsiveness will frustrate customers, and he uses restaurant and bank analogies to make the point. Only once those basics are at median do differentiators have an effect.
“But those table stake things all have to be relatively at median for us to then have cool things that will really separate us.”
Strategy has two halves: avoid frustrating customers on table-stakes basics, and build two or three real competitive advantages.
Chuck says half of strategy is matching competitors on the ordinary things customers expect, such as billing, invoicing and response speed. The other half is two or three true advantages that customers would choose you for. He says a company should be able to tell a customer face to face why they should buy from it.
“Half of strategy is not frustrating your customers, so half of strategy is going through the orthodox table stake, things that we do day in and day out, and ensuring that we're not frustrating our customers relative to what they could get with competitors.”
She wants about 80% of 1mind's resources on future bets and parity on basic features.
She described a two-hour leadership debate about building for what customers want now, like email, versus what will move the needle. She said they would reach parity on basics and put around 80% of resources into the future, acknowledging that people may not buy it yet.
“let's put like 80 % of our resources to the future.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Fully replacing human go-to-market functions with AI agents is not yet working.
2 independent voices · 2 shows
said Marc Ferrentino (Topline), Kyle Norton (The Revenue Leadership Podcast)
2 sources
Engineering-led companies that replaced marketing with agents later came back complaining that their outbound and content were not working.
Marc describes prospects whose engineer CEO planned to build the whole marketing function as agents, and says he told them good luck. He says many of these companies later returned complaining about outbound results, content resonance and lead generation. He argues that the engineering worldview that AI can do everything is dominant on X and is fed by posts saying everyone is cooked.
“many of those companies have come back to us months later after complaining why their outbound isn't working, complaining why their content isn't resonating, complaining why they have no leads.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Fully agentic SMB sales is not yet working for a company selling to mom-and-pop restaurants, and its agentic experiment has had mediocre success so far.
Kyle said these customers did not go to college and struggle to get on a Google Meet, so the BDR has to help them with that step. He said massive companies already run fully self-serve motions at the bottom of the market, and that AI makes that experience better and may push it further up market.
“So we're trying to to give an agentic experience for the bottom of the market with like uh mediocre success so far.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Companies will keep buying software rather than building it themselves, even as building gets easier.
3 independent voices · 3 shows1 new this month
said Keith Peiris (Topline), Joubin Mirzadegan (Grit), Kyle Norton (The Revenue Leadership Podcast)
3 sources
Even a fast-growing company buys software rather than vibe-coding it, because it wants someone else to own support and maintenance.
Keith said Lightfield buys a lot of software even as a high-growth company. The reason is that it wants a vendor to own supporting and advancing the product, so it doesn't fall apart six months later when there are 30 reps. He was dismissive of the trend of people on Twitter saying they'll vibe-code their own CRM.
“part of the reason we want to buy software instead of building it ourselves is because we want someone else to own... supporting it, advancing it, you know, making sure that it doesn't fall apart six months from now when I've got 30 reps.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Silicon Valley overestimates how much companies want to build their own software.
He argues that even if building is easier, it still consumes engineers on something non-strategic like CPQ, and Valley CIOs and CTOs who tinker aren't representative of CTOs globally. Roadrunner itself has a buy-first policy: buy anything that moves the company forward, and only put engineers on internal projects if they run out of roadmap. He acknowledges the build-versus-buy evaluation is changing.
“I would say we in Silicon Valley probably overestimate people's willingness to want to build things.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
An internally built enrichment waterfall limited system access to two people, so buying a tool like Clay would give more people access.
Kyle said his team built waterfall enrichment in late 2022 before Clay was widely known. RevOps does not get good access and his BDR leader cannot make changes, so he said he would use Clay. He said he does not think access should go down to the rep level, and that his company takes a different approach there.
“because it's all like we in internally built it, only two people can really interact with these systems. And like RevOps doesn't really get good access.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Human experts will remain permanently in the loop for many AI-delivered services.
3 independent voices · 2 shows
said Tomasz Tunguz (Topline), Jake Saper ([Un]Churned), Bryan Murphy (Topline)
3 sources
Tunguz expects forward-deployed engineers to remain a long-term part of software, because someone expert must validate AI output.
A host described FDEs today as an inelegant inefficiency, since the work has to be redone every time the model changes, and asked whether improving AI would remove the need for them. Tunguz said no, calling FDEs a very long-term phenomenon and comparing them to management consultants. He argued that someone with domain expertise will still need to validate that the AI is doing something properly, comparing it to structural engineers who stamp diagrams.
“Like FTEs today are an inefficiency.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Jake Saper expects some AINS businesses to need a licensed human in the loop permanently where regulation requires it, using customs brokerage as an example.
He describes licensed professionals who must assign tariffs to every imported item in a tariff regime that changes constantly. He says AI should be well suited to the work, but a licensed person is still required, which he sees as an enduring angle.
“you're required to have this licensed person kind of in the loop, and I think that is kind of an interesting, enduring angle.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Bryan expects the future of Smartling's business to be a combination of fully automated and human-in-the-loop translation.
He said customers need high volume, which automation handles, and very high quality for certain types of assets. He said the change will be less about moving everything to AI and more about doing more with the right type of translation.
“I think it's going to be a combination”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- AI's pace makes multi-year roadmaps unreliable, so planning horizons must shrink to months.
2 independent voices · 2 shows
said Margo Martin ([Un]Churned), Wade Foster (Topline)
3 sources
Deltek's plan from last year became partly obsolete because AI let it move faster, so work planned for five or six years is now rolling out this year.
Margo Martin said Deltek's annual plan from last year had goals like getting customers live faster and reducing support calls. Once Claude let them go faster, things they had expected to take five or six years to roll out began launching this year. She said the speed-up made parts of the original plan nearly obsolete.
“the things we thought were going to take five years, maybe six years to roll out, we were starting to roll them out this year”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
A five-year AI roadmap is not realistic right now, and a three-month roadmap is about as far as planning can go.
She said Deltek can't lay out a five-year AI roadmap because everything is changing so rapidly. Given that pace, she said a three-month roadmap is about as useful. She wants the person in the new role to check every morning whether the company is still headed in the right direction.
“you may as well lay out a three-month roadmap because everything is changing so rapidly”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Multi-year product roadmaps are less accurate now because new models arrive every three to six months and their capabilities emerge over time.
Wade said you often do not know what a new model can do on day one, but over weeks and months you learn what experiences it allows. He said he finds the accuracy of three-year visions and one-year roadmaps to be much lower now.
“I find the percent of correctness of those documents to be just a lot lower these days.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Vertical integration is worth it to control delivery speed and unit economics, not to stack margin.
2 independent voices · 2 shows2 new this month
said Chase Lochmiller (The Twenty Minute VC), Baiju Bhatt (Grit)
4 sources
Crusoe vertically integrated for availability, cost visibility and innovation rather than to stack margin.
Lochmiller says electrical manufacturing is not an ultra-high-margin business, though margins have risen with shortages. The main benefits are on-time delivery, end-to-end visibility into true costs (he cites Elon Musk's 'idiot index', the end-product cost relative to raw materials), and freedom to design from first principles. The Abilene campus was designed as a one-gigawatt-scale computer running one cohesive workload on a single RDMA fabric.
“it's not the main reason we're doing it is like stacking margin. It's more availability and getting availability, being able to deliver on time.”
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Crusoe built a 100-week-lead-time power component in-house in 28 weeks, which Lochmiller credits to having vertically integrated electrical manufacturing.
For the first two buildings in Abilene, a little over 200 megawatts, Crusoe committed to a one-year build when the next-closest of 34 other developers bid two and a half years. Vendors quoted a 100-week lead time for medium-voltage power distribution centres. Crusoe's internal team sourced the components and made them in 28 weeks. Lochmiller describes the AI data centre supply chain as 'whack-a-mole', with the bottleneck shifting over time.
“When we went out and canvassed the market for vendors that were supplying these medium voltage power distribution centers, the lead time for this one component was a hundred weeks.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
There is nowhere near enough launch capacity for demand, so Cowboy Space concluded it must build its own launch to control its scale and economics.
Asked why Cowboy can't just use existing launch providers, Bhatt said there isn't enough mass-to-orbit or rideshare capacity available. He noted that SpaceX has said it will use much of its own payload for its own projects. To control how it operates, its scale and its unit economics, Cowboy concluded it had to treat launch as part of a vertically integrated system.
“there is nowhere near enough launch capacity that's available for what everybody in the world wants to do.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Bhatt's Robinhood lesson is that controlling the unit economics of your output necessarily leads to vertical integration, though each component remains a non-dogmatic build-versus-buy decision.
He says Robinhood vertically integrated a lot over its history to control unit economics. Cowboy Space is building much of its stack, including rockets, though not all of it. Some component technology can be bought, and each case is decided on whether it keeps the output cost competitive with the terrestrial option.
“if you want to control the unit economics of your output service, it necessarily leads you to vertically integrating, right? To controlling the sort of components that drive it.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- A new market or enterprise motion should be run as a separate early-stage venture judged on learning, not committed revenue.
2 independent voices · 2 shows
said Mark Roberge (The Science of Scaling), Usha Iyer (The Revenue Leadership Podcast)
5 sources
Mark suggests treating a new enterprise motion as a separate business, with its own team, demand gen, pricing, quota and product.
He says the enterprise motion needs its own version of each go-to-market element, and that thinking this way helps move toward the right design even though a company cannot fully separate them. He presents this as a way to test an org design against the go-to-market system from his show.
“think about this as a separate business, a separate team, a separate demand gen motion, a separate pricing model, a separate quota, a separate product”
Committing revenue to an unproven enterprise test is a pothole, and Mark sees a board plan with late, small enterprise revenue as conservative.
Alex said enterprise revenue is in the board plan but late. Mark calls that conservative because the test is not being scaled yet, and a miss by half would not blow the overall number.
“If we miss it by half, it doesn't blow the overall number.”
HiveBright ran the acquired Orbit product through a three-person SWAT team for six months before rolling it out to the whole organization.
Usha says HiveBright set up a team of three people outside sales, customer success and implementation to secure the first Orbit customer and work out how to take it to market. For the first six months, the SWAT team joined sales cycles where Orbit could be pitched, and the team picked up the first million dollars of revenue that way before organization-wide rollout.
“we set up a SWAT team of just three people outside of sales, outside of customer success, outside of implementation.”
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A company that has product-market fit in one market often lacks it in a new one, so entering a new market should be treated like an early-stage venture.
Mark says Formlabs had product-market fit wherever it already sold, maybe manufacturing, noting it did a lot with companies such as Ford and GE, but medical devices were a different market. He argues founders are overly optimistic about applying what they learned in one product-market combination to another, and that the rep should not have been on a performance plan; he said a few product managers and engineers should have been working out the message.
“you got to think like a seed funded business. You don't have product market fit yet.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Early enterprise reps need clear lines into product, leadership and legal, and should be judged on capturing voice-of-customer information rather than ROI.
Kevin Egan said early enterprise reps need a clear line of communication into product, company leadership and legal. He said their ROI may be questionable, but what matters is whether they are the best communication avenues and can capture voice-of-customer information that helps the company decide whether going upstream is worthwhile.
“when you decide to go upstream you are starting over you almost need like a little seed funded team”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Building an AI-native system of record is a more durable position than building a workflow tool.
2 independent voices · 2 shows2 new this month
said Manny Medina (Topline), Alex Mashrabov (The Twenty Minute VC)
2 sources
Manny Medina chose to build Paid as a system of record rather than a workflow tool, because workflow products face constant churn risk.
Paid owns the record of what the agent did, the credits charged and the auditability of both, which Manny calls a financial record. He acknowledges a higher bar, since billing errors and credit misassignments are a real risk when code is increasingly writing itself. He says workflow tools are like being a shark: always moving, with customers able to churn at any minute.
“I don't want to build workflows anymore because workflows is like being a shark.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Whoever builds an AI-native system of record will win, and for Higgsfield that means a searchable, brand-aware asset library.
Using Solve Intelligence's patent-workflow system of record as an example, he says creative assets today are scattered across Dropbox, Google Drive, Miro and Frame.io. Marketers want to search content and check it against brand guidelines through natural interfaces, which semantic understanding now makes possible. He says Adobe and Canva built for a 'pixel first era'. Higgsfield invests in a harness that learns a customer's visual style over time, which he says Claude and OpenAI cannot necessarily do.
“So whoever can create a AI native system of records is going to win.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Zero tolerance for error and regulatory or contractual accountability create real moats.
2 independent voices · 2 shows
said Joubin Mirzadegan (Grit), Liz Christo (Topline)
2 sources
For a mission-critical system like CPQ, contractual accountability for failure is itself a moat.
Joubin Mirzadegan says that if Roadrunner goes down on the last day of a quarter and a customer such as HubSpot misses its number, Roadrunner gets sued; it's written into the contract, and the CIO and possibly CRO would be fired. He calls it an accountability moat. Mark Roberge agreed: a product that might look like a model wrapper isn't going to be production-ready if built in-house, no one wants to take that risk, and they want to put it on a vendor.
“It's almost like a CYA moat. It's like an accountability moat”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Zero tolerance for error or strict regulation or compliance risk can be a real moat, though she says she has not done much work in regulated markets.
Liz says there are meaningful reasons a market can have zero tolerance for error, or face real regulatory or compliance risk, that create a moat. She hedges that she has not done a ton of work in this area but sees it in some places.
“You've got, like meaningful reasons where there can be like zero tolerance for error or you have like real stringent regulation or compliance risk like that can be a real thing.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Foundation model companies expanding up the stack are a major new threat that kills AI application startups.
3 independent voices · 3 shows
said Mark Roberge (Grit, The Science of Scaling), Jeremey Donovan (The Revenue Leadership Podcast)
3 sources
AI-era startups face two threats: incumbents cannibalizing themselves fast enough, and customers building with foundation models.
Joubin Mirzadegan frames the moat question as whether an incumbent like Salesforce will cannibalize its business and re-architect before a startup gets to distribution, or whether an enterprise will simply build the tool with Claude Code. Mark Roberge said competing with incumbents is not new; the new threat is the foundation model coming from below.
“the new one now is the foundational model from below.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Buyers fear that a point-solution tool will be replicated quickly by a foundation LLM company.
He said many buyers are afraid of being the one who buys a point solution only to have a foundation model company build the same capability pretty quickly. He noted that point solutions are great in some instances, but in many cases a good-enough do-it-yourself build with some prompts is possible, and he does not want to buy technology that is instantly obsolete.
“I think a lot of buyers are afraid that they're going to be the dope who buys the point solution tool only to have one of the foundation LLM companies just be able to do that capability.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Native AI startups must defend against both incumbents and foundation models, and that foundation models integrating up probably killed more than half of the failed $100M+ AI startups.
Mark says that besides the usual risk of legacy incumbents building the product into their platforms, native AI companies face a new risk from foundation models expanding up the stack. He describes a growing graveyard of AI startups that raised over $100 million and are now at zero. He gives 'probably more than half' as his estimate of how many failed for this reason. He says investors and job seekers must analyze the long-term moat against both pressures.
“there's already a growing graveyard of native AI startups that raised over $100 million and they're now at zero. And for probably more than half, it was because the foundational models integrated up.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Product-market fit is never permanent and must be re-established repeatedly.
2 independent voices · 2 shows
said Brett Queener ([Un]Churned), Mark Roberge (Topline)
2 sources
Some of his founders have to find and refine product-market fit every three to six months, which he says was not the case five years ago.
He presents this as part of the journey that everyone has been feeling, describing founders chasing a thesis that keeps shifting. He gives the three-to-six-month cadence as what some of his founders face now. The figure is his description of his portfolio.
“some of my founders have to find and refine product market fit every three to six months. That wasn't the case five years ago.”
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Product-market fit is always at risk, and he has never seen a business scale where it did not become at risk.
Mark said product-market fit can erode because of technology, macro conditions, competitive landscapes or customer desires. He said he thinks LinkedIn Recruiter stayed in use for eight years because the other tools lost product-market fit. He argued that a business should measure product-market fit about three quarters before its peers do.
“I've never seen a business scale where product market fit does not become at risk because of movements in technology, macro conditions, competitive landscapes, customer desires.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Enterprise AI value comes from use cases with concrete ROI or revenue impact, not from simple chat, research or dashboards.
2 independent voices · 2 shows
said Amanda Kahlow (Topline), Ping Wu (Grit)
3 sources
Pointing AI at forecasting, research and dashboards produces minor efficiency gains rather than revenue impact.
Amanda Kahlow says most go-to-market teams are using AI for better forecasting, faster research and dashboards that can be queried, which makes existing people marginally more productive. Her thesis is that buying and selling happens in the conversation, so tools built around the conversation are yesterday's workflow. She describes the realistic end point as AI at the centre of outcome-driven buyer conversations aimed at shorter sales cycles and higher ACV, with real revenue impact.
“But I don't think that's gonna move the needle. That's going to create minor efficiency gains to make the people that you have more productive.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Ping Wu expects enterprise AI pilots to converge on use cases with clear ROI, naming coding and contact center transformation as likely examples.
He said pilots will narrow to use cases with concrete value, such as automation and AI that helps humans in sales and support. Asked whether the music will stop, he said Cresta cares less about that and focuses on what drives long-term, undeniable value.
“I think as time goes by, and people start to converge on use cases that will drive very concrete, undeniable ROI, coding is probably one of them. And then Contact Center, CX Transformations, definitely the other one.”
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Rag chat-over-text applications were the largest workload at Pinecone but did not create ROI for the ISVs using them.
Lauren Nemeth said rag is probably the biggest workload coming into Pinecone and is the talk of the town. However, many rag use cases were simple chat over text, and those did not create ROI for ISV customers. She said the clearer ROI comes when AI takes over human tasks through agents, gen AI applications or lower hallucination rates.
“those weren't actually creating ROI for those ISVs.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Network effects remain a real moat in the AI era.
2 independent voices · 2 shows1 new this month
said Alex Mashrabov (The Twenty Minute VC), Liz Christo (Topline)
2 sources
The only moats today are delivering an outcome and network effects.
For Higgsfield, the outcome is helping businesses sell more through AI ads. On network effects, he says AI does not replace them and he doubts agent swarms will in the next five years. Higgsfield encourages its community to open-source projects others can fork, as on GitHub; he says these grew from about 10 seeded projects eight weeks ago to over 10,000, and he believes this can become a moat over time.
“We do believe that there are only two ways of modern value creation or moats today. First is when you deliver the outcome.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Network effects are real, particularly in vertical software, and distinguishes them from virality.
Liz says that winning follow-the-leader accounts and early customers can create real network effects, as opposed to virality. She says the logo momentum from those accounts can be used to build such effects.
“I do think network effects are real, particularly in vertical software.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Moving upmarket requires retooling the product, engineering and the whole company, not just changing the sales motion.
2 independent voices · 2 shows
said Sahir Azam (Revenue Builders), Carina Brockl (The Science of Scaling)
5 sources
Moving upmarket is a retooling of the whole product and company, not only a change in sales motion
Azam said a PLG company whose board pushes it upmarket to drive higher ASPs faces a retooling of its product and the whole company in a lot of ways. A host added that a cultural shift is needed and often gets lost. Azam was describing patterns he has seen rather than a prescription for any one company.
“And that's a retooling of the whole product and the whole company in a lot of ways.”
A company built only around a PLG motion, with its financial model built the same way, struggles when the board demands an upmarket shift
A host described companies that start with PLG only and build a financial model and company around it with no emphasis on enterprise. When the board then asks for bigger deals and to go upmarket, the company and its financial model are not built to support that. The host added that a cultural shift is needed and that this gets lost, especially with technical founders.
“They start in only PLG.”
Moving upmarket requires an enterprise-ready product, though not a perfect one, and an organization willing to collect and close the gaps.
Carina Brockl says you have to dive into the product: can it meet enterprise security and workflow requirements, and does it still work with 500 people on the platform? In solar, enterprise meant a cluster of large nationwide installers. She says the product rarely starts out ready, so sales must collect requirements from customers and work with the product org to close the gaps.
“And it doesn't have to be perfect. I want to say that. But the company needs to be ready and to focus on the enterprise because the product will need work in there typically.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
She said moving up-market or into sales-led growth is a company-wide effort that needs engineering, not only a change to go-to-market, based on a mistake she made earlier.
In a prior role she assumed that moving up-market, going sales-led or going international was a go-to-market effort, and only later brought in engineering. At Lattice the CTO asked where the company should invest because bandwidth was limited, and this forced the choice to move up-market rather than keep both motions.
“I've known that like that's a company wide effort and you need, you need everyone focused on it for you to be successful in that approach.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Building an enterprise motion meant hiring senior sellers and building trust and security infrastructure, including custom data center implementations for large banks.
Kevin Egan said that building out Salesforce's enterprise motion started with hiring senior sellers who know how to get into large complex accounts. Around 2007 and 2008, landing a large bank and a large insurance company brought requirements the company had not seen before, so Salesforce built its own data center implementations for them. He said trust, security and people, process and technology all had to be in place to take on a bank like that.
“I think we actually built out our own data center implementations for those companies.”
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- As product advantages thin, go-to-market execution and relationships become the decisive differentiator.
2 independent voices · 2 shows
said Tomasz Tunguz (Topline), Brian McCarthy (Revenue Builders)
2 sources
Go-to-market innovation now matters more to investors than before, because product advantage is thinning.
He said the go-to-market innovation of the previous era was significant, citing Dropbox as a PLG company and Zoom reinventing go-to-market around video conferencing. He said open source selling directly into the enterprise at Confluent was also a go-to-market innovation. He said investors now look for a founder who can execute a go-to-market move that produces a lot of leverage for the company.
“the go to market innovation is now significantly more important than it was. And if you can find a founder who can execute a beautiful go to market judo move and produce a lot of leverage for the company, then it's incredible”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Technology is easily swapped, so the lasting advantage is the seller who solves business problems and builds trusted relationships.
Brian said the technology in this space is easily swappable, while solving business problems and building champions and trusted relationships is not. He said sellers who anticipate needs and build for the incomplete software development lifecycle will win the accounts.
“technology right now in this space is easily swappable. What's not is solving business problems.”
- Major AI categories are big enough to support multiple winners rather than a single category king.
2 independent voices · 2 shows1 new this month
said Jack Altman (The Twenty Minute VC), Ghazi Masood (Topline)
2 sources
Personal agents acting across the third-party internet are a paradigm shift big enough for independent players to win alongside the labs, as happened in coding.
Benchmark (his partners Peter and Ev led the deal) invested in Instinct's $1B Series C at $10B despite competition from Meta's Muse. He compared the setup to Cursor and Cognition competing with the labs in coding. He said that when a category is that important, 'a lot of things can win', and that the labs will also have offerings.
“when something is that important, a lot of things can win. And so my view is basically something like there can be an amazing independent player like instinct.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
The AI application creation market is too big for one winner, drawing on the history of the CRM market.
He said Salesforce was dominant but the CRM market was big enough for multiple players, and he thinks the same will hold here. He framed this as his personal belief and said he has no crystal ball. He sees Replit focused on the knowledge worker rather than the developer and engineer.
“this is my personal belief is the market is so big that there's going to be room for different players in the market to go capture it”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- SaaS incumbents are not being displaced by AI and are well placed to benefit from it.
5 independent voices · 1 show1 new this month
said Manny Medina (Topline), Steve Cox (Topline), Michael Walrath (Topline), AJ Bruno (Topline), Kyle Norton (Topline)
6 sources
Manny Medina predicts that no software will be non-agentic within five years, and that SaaS incumbents, not upstarts, are the primary beneficiaries.
Manny says he used to argue around San Francisco that SaaS was dead and would take the shift lying down, but has changed his mind. SaaS companies already have knowledge and workflows embedded in their software, which makes them best placed to build agents on top of their stack. Their challenge is figuring out how to capture value, and if they don't, someone else will.
“So they are the primary beneficiaries of building agents on top of their stack. And they just need to figure out how to capture value. And if they don't, somebody else will.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
Steve Cox is not planning to spend time fighting the narrative that AI will replace SaaS, because he expects it to play out on its own.
He points to SaaS companies that recovered in the stock market after the SaaS selloff, with growth, retention and earnings numbers that he says remain strong. He says his concern is not the AI-disruption narrative itself.
“I think this will naturally play its course.”
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There is very little evidence that AI-native companies are taking software spend from incumbents.
He called this the inconvenient truth of the SaaS apocalypse: there is very little evidence the software pie is being eaten in any meaningful way by AI-native companies. A host agreed, pointing to Yext's own churn data, where accounts spending over $50k a year (about 90% of revenue) show almost no churn, and said AI-era growers are generating other revenue rather than taking that share.
“actually there's very little evidence right now that that the software pie is being in any meaningful way by the AI native companies.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
AJ Bruno is bullish that ServiceNow can double its revenue to $32 billion by 2030, citing its distribution.
AJ Bruno says the market has over-rotated against companies like ServiceNow and that its distribution, at a scale comparable to Salesforce, is the key factor. He links this to the view that public incumbents such as Atlassian may work out how to adapt.
“ServiceNow is on the scale of Salesforce and their distribution and power distribution.”
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Kyle Norton has moved from bearish to very bullish on Salesforce because it has become the hub for integrations, partners, governance and AI.
Kyle Norton says Salesforce's acquisitions, including Bluebirds, Momentum and Informatica, show it is all in on AI. He says the ecosystem gives Salesforce an advantage as the pivot point where integrations, partners, roles and permissions sit. Another participant adds that growing a $40 billion business may be hard to show in public markets, but that this doesn't stop Salesforce from delivering value to CROs and sales teams.
“I went from being a bear on Salesforce 24 months ago to being like very bullish on Salesforce now”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
AI replacing SaaS is a lazy argument; AI is compressing the time value of money, so market corrections are happening faster.
AJ Bruno argued that the common view that AI will replace SaaS misses the point. He said AI is compressing the time value of money, so public markets are repricing software companies more quickly than before.
“What AI is doing is it's compressing the time value of money.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Early AI-native services traction can be mirage product-market fit, so founders should ration customers until autonomy is productized.
2 independent voices · 1 show1 new this month
said Grant Clarke ([Un]Churned), Jake Saper ([Un]Churned)
2 sources
Grant Clarke applies Emergence Capital's 'Mirage PMF' idea to AINS: early inbound interest should be rationed, accepting slower revenue while you productize, before opening the floodgates.
Grant credits Jake Saper's AINS playbook at Emergence Capital. In that playbook, early interest from many customers is a 'Mirage PMF', and taking them all on risks diluting the autonomous leverage you are building. The approach is to choose customers who participate in the build, accept a flatter early revenue curve, and focus on learning loops and proof points that the trained model succeeds more and fails less. Once the knowledge base, guardrails and evals are productized, you can take on 10 more customers at once without proportional cost. Josh Schachter calls it 'go fast to go slow to then go fast again,' and both add that it takes discipline.
“And you may have a little bit of a flattening of the curve early on in revenue. but you're doing that because you're working on the signals.”
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Jake Saper calls the biggest AINS risk mirage product-market fit, where revenue scales and customers are happy but humans deliver most of the service.
He says that is just a services business and a low-margin one that should not take venture capital. He says a 30% margin AI-based accounting business could be a great bootstrapped company, or it needs a credible path to higher margins.
“And that's just a service. That's not an AI native service. And that's a low margin business that should not take venture capital.”
Listen on Apple Podcasts Episode Strategy & market Link to this
- Product-led growth alone cannot carry a company to large scale; it must be paired with an enterprise sales motion.
2 independent voices · 1 show
said Brian McCarthy (Revenue Builders), Sahir Azam (Revenue Builders)
6 sources
Companies that grew through PLG but never converted into enterprise businesses mostly failed, according to research Cursor's co-founders did.
Brian said Cursor's co-founders argued that anything easily acquired is easily lost, and that building an enduring company requires marrying PLG with sticky enterprise sales. He said they researched companies that grew in PLG but never made the enterprise conversion and most of them failed.
“Companies that grew up in PLG but never made the conversion into enterprise, most of them, most of them failed.”
PLG and enterprise sales are not either-or; each serves a different buyer segment and both belong in one go-to-market architecture
At MongoDB, some developers and startups would never be reached by outbound sellers and needed a frictionless self-service path, while regulated large enterprises would never buy on a credit card and needed sophisticated sellers to break in. Azam said he worked backwards from getting the product into as many customers and segments as possible to an architecture combining PLG, high-velocity sales, customer success and strategic enterprise selling, with smooth handoffs between channels. He called this a constant work in progress.
“I never looked at it as an either or.”
Bottom-up motions alone do not get a company to a billion dollars; a company has to exploit both bottom-up and top-down selling.
Mark Roberge says many companies run a bottom-up motion to their first $10 million, $50 million or $100 million and then find it fails when they go top-down. He attributes a lot of that failure to not understanding the decision-making unit in larger deals. He says bottom-up was rarely an option before the internet, freemium and product-led growth.
“But to become a billion dollar business, you actually have to exploit both.”
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The public product-led growth companies all have a large enterprise sales team, and the sales organization usually arrives later.
Mark says he cannot think of a public PLG company without a vibrant large enterprise sales team. He notes Shopify reached $100 million in revenue without one, and argues that layering in a sales organization is necessary to unlock the multibillion-dollar opportunity.
“I can't think of one that doesn't have a vibrant large enterprise sales team.”
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Self-serve buyers at a certain revenue level will not commit to a large annual plan without some relationship with the company.
At Shopify Plus, merchants that had outgrown the standard plans would not invest about $25,000 a year without a relationship with someone at the company, even when they agreed with the product checklist. Loren describes this as an emotional break in the buyer at a certain MRR or ARR, which is why Shopify Plus added a sales team.
“I'm not going to invest $25,000 a year, which for a startup is a decent amount of money, without having some kind of relationship with the company.”
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PLG alone only takes a company so far, and formal sales and marketing are needed to unlock more of the market
Dino cited Atlassian, Datadog, GitHub and GitLab as proof that a lot of selling can be done with the product itself. He said, however, that a PLG company can only take the motion so far from a scale standpoint, and can only unlock so much of its total addressable market without a more formal sales and marketing strategy. He said he is very pro PLG based on his experience at Snyk.
“you can only take it so far from a scale standpoint”
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- An early ICP should be the segment a company can win fastest and repeatably, ideally with references, not the one in the pitch deck.
2 independent voices · 1 show
said Dan Sperring (Revenue Builders), Mark Roberge (Revenue Builders)
3 sources
A segment belongs in the ICP only if it is high-LTV, relatively easy to win, and sizable and healthy.
Dan says an ICP segment needs three things in common: high lifetime value with happy customers who drive inbound, relative ease of winning compared with other segments, and a sizable segment that is healthy. He says the third test is the one go-to-market leaders most often miss.
“It needs to be high-LTV, happy customers that drive inbound.”
An ideal customer profile is the segment your salespeople actually go after and close, not the one written on the website or pitch deck.
Roberge says founders often try to prove every region and segment in year one, when the more useful step is to pick the market that is easiest to win repeatably. He tells founders that they think their ICP is what is on their website and in their pitch deck, while the real ICP is who their salespeople go after and close.
“Your ICP is who your salespeople go after and close.”
Early ICP work started from where deals landed fastest and where reference customers already existed.
Bosworth says her first ICP analysis looked at where Checkr landed deals, and landed them fastest, and at where it had reference customers, since selling without names to drop is hard. She says Checkr had most of the gig economy as customers, which gave it logos to reference. It began with three or four ICPs and now has five or six, and she calls the process ever-evolving.
“we owned the gig economy 90 of 95 of the gig economy works with checker”
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- AI is eroding the switching costs and pricing power that protected system-of-record incumbents.
2 independent voices · 1 show
said Asad Zaman (Topline), Liz Christo (Topline), Sam Jacobs (Topline)
6 sources
Asad Zaman expects cheaper switching and delightful new software to compress the moats around system-of-record incumbents.
Asad Zaman says he has a feeling that customers will have less stickiness with platforms as AI makes it easier to move quickly. He contrasts the old software that never delighted him with a recent Replit experience he found delightful. He says he expects a significant shift in how these companies make customers feel.
“I have a feeling that where we're going, customers have less stickiness with platforms”
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Strong net revenue retention at legacy software companies may have masked customers who felt trapped rather than loyal.
Asad Zaman says some software companies had signs of strong customer relationships, such as high NRR, but their customers felt locked in with no good alternatives. He says the switching alternative was more painful than the status quo. He presents this as a reason to reassess the moats of those companies.
“there was a generation of software companies that had signs that they had really good customer relationships. You know, NRR is an example of that. But their customers felt more like prisoners.”
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Switching costs have fallen and will keep falling, prompting a host to ask what stickiness she would still underwrite.
She says it is becoming easier to keep data outside a software system, to access it in real time, and to move it with AI or integrations, which reduces the pain of switching that software once had. A host then asked her what version of stickiness she is still willing to underwrite.
“the switching costs have gone down and I think will continue to go down as it's easier to have your data outside of the system”
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A host expects Salesforce to face many more competitors, which he says will sharply reduce its pricing power, though he does not expect companies to build their own CRMs.
The speaker says the cost of generating software has fallen so low that there will be 10 times more competitors to Salesforce, even though he does not think people will spin up their own CRM to replace it. He says this will dramatically reduce the pricing power and leverage Salesforce has with customers. Another host said he was not sure that was true.
“But there are going to be 10 times more competitors to Salesforce. And so the pricing power and leverage that Salesforce has with their customers is going to dramatically fall.”
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Legacy companies have lost pricing leverage and need to rethink strategy, but the claim that AI is an existential risk to white-collar work has no precedent yet.
Sam Jacobs says the argument that certain legacy companies have lost leverage and need to rethink their strategy sounds valid to him, but the argument that the technology represents a fundamental existential risk to white-collar work has no precedent. Asad Zaman agrees, saying he does not believe in that risk yet and does not want to react to any one quick thing.
“My point is the argument that certain legacy companies have lost leverage and need to rethink their strategy in the wake of this new technology, that sounds valid to me.”
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Systems of record will lose pricing power as accessing data becomes less critical, though Sam did not expect them to disappear.
Sam Jacobs said database and system-of-record vendors like Workday face pressure because accessing the data will no longer be the critical thing, so they will have less leverage. He said the core premise was that customers rarely switch, and that this is now less certain, while software as a category will keep growing around the agentic layer.
“therefore they will have less pricing power and less leverage”
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- Much current M&A consists of companies acqui-hiring AI teams rather than buying businesses.
2 independent voices · 1 show1 new this month
said Asad Zaman (Topline), Peter Walker (Topline)
2 sources
Companies are acquiring both to buy capabilities, even though AI coding tools make building easier, and to acquire talent, sometimes taking only the founders.
Asad Zaman said an acquisition can give a buyer a jumping-off point even when tools like Codex and Claude Code make building product easier. Companies that raise rounds are also hunting for small startups to acqui-hire. He cited Google's deal for the Windsurf founders to lead a division, which he said left the rest of the team out in the cold, as the kind of deal employees should worry about.
“They're buying capabilities, even though building product has become easier because of things like Codex and Claude Code.”
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Most current M&A is bigger startups buying AI-focused teams, not PE firms buying older companies for their terminal value.
Peter says that although there is a lot of M&A, the majority is bigger startups acquiring AI-focused teams to change their culture and product. He contrasts this with older companies being bought by PE funds to be milked for their terminal value. He says nobody can know what a company will be worth in ten years, which makes terminal value hard to rely on.
“the majority of that M&A is bigger startups buying AI made up teams to like invigorate their culture and change the way their product works.”
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- Strategy only works when it is translated into specific execution expectations and activities for each role.
2 independent voices · 1 show1 new this month
said John Kaplan (Revenue Builders), Dr. Chuck Bamford (Revenue Builders)
2 sources
A SKO should break a vision down into the strategy to reach it and the specific execution expected of reps.
Kaplan described a sequence: first paint a picture of what great could look like, then make clear the strategy to get there, then state the execution expectation attached to it, and said many people get it wrong. McMahon replied that there is often a big disconnect between the vision and what the rep will do tomorrow.
“First you gotta paint a picture of what great could look like.”
Convert leadership's KPIs into the specific activities each role should perform, because leadership's plans are hypotheses about what will move those KPIs.
Chuck says leadership believes investments and employee activities will move KPIs but rarely defines those activities or turns KPIs into activity metrics. He gives the example of a fry clerk at McDonald's who cannot see how the job ties to strategy, and says this conversion is hard work that many leaders skip or cannot do.
“one of the big disconnects in business is that everything that leadership does is hypothesis.”
- A real moat must survive a well-funded team copying the product and selling it cheaper; anything copyable in weeks is not an advantage.
2 independent voices · 1 show
said Dr. Chuck Bamford (Revenue Builders), John McMahon (Revenue Builders)
4 sources
If a competitor could take a capability away within a week, it is not a competitive advantage.
Chuck says a key test is the runway, meaning how long a competitor would need to neutralise the capability, and he distinguishes between something merely differentiated and a true advantage. He also says the substitutes for each advantage should be considered carefully.
“You come up with something really cool that a competitor can take away from you in a week. It's not competitive advantage.”
Ask a company to explain why its advantage is defensible, since a rival could copy an indefensible one quickly
After the three questions, McMahon asks what the company's real secret sauce is and how it would defend it. He says that if the answer is that it is not defensible, the warning sign is that somebody could do the same thing tomorrow.
“if they say it's not defensible, somebody could do the same thing tomorrow.”
Test a moat by asking how you still win if a well-funded team rebuilds your product and sells it for half the price
Mark Roberge proposed this litmus test: imagine a group of engineers from a large AI company leave and rebuild your product, and a top venture firm funds them with 20 million dollars to sell it for half the price. He said that if you cannot answer how you still win, you do not have a real moat. He said that many features that look like moats, such as a feature a competitor could build in two months, are not moats.
“how do you still win when these ankle biters are out there selling your exact product for half the price?”
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A moat test asks whether you would still win if a well-funded team copied your product and sold it for half the price.
Mark said the test is to imagine five strong engineers leaving a large tech company with a $10 million term sheet, copying the product and selling it for half the price, then asking why you still win. He said a single feature is not a sustainable moat, because if a rival could build it in about three months the advantage is weak.
“What if five amazing engineers from Google quit got a $10 million term sheet from Sequoia and copied your product and sold it for half the price? Why do you still win? That's the moat test.”
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- Market tailwinds let the hottest AI companies grow predictably despite weak operations, which is not the same as having a system.
2 independent voices · 1 show1 new this month
said Jen Igartua (Topline), Keenan (Topline)
2 sources
The fastest-growing AI-native companies grow in spite of their operations because demand outruns any infrastructure that can be built.
Her AI-native clients, which she names as Wispr Flow, Exa, Perplexity and Fireworks, have hiring plans so large that Go Nimbly cannot build process fast enough. A handful of SDRs make it work because inbound is so heavy, so in her view the go-to-market job is to maximise success that is already assured. She compares it to Zendesk in 2016, whose head of IT told her they had grown in spite of their operations.
“They are growing in spite of their operations because there's just no way for us to keep up with that speed.”
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Heroic revenue can be predictable for a while when the market provides a tailwind, but he argued this does not replace a system.
He named AI leaders as examples of companies that may get revenue predictably because of market conditions for a time. He said individuals doing things differently does not mean an organisation lacks a system. On the example of a large asset manager, he said he did not want to touch it but would attribute it to brand.
“There are products and services and brands that can predictably get revenue because of the market. So they have a tailwind.”
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- Community should serve every function in a company, not just marketing.
2 independent voices · 1 show
said Chris Catania ([Un]Churned), Brian Oblinger ([Un]Churned)
2 sources
Community should be positioned as a service to almost every function in a company, not as a marketing channel.
Chris Catania says he presents community as a service to the other parts of the business and learns each function's language to show where it adds to their work. He gives sales, customer experience and product as examples of teams it can serve. He says leaders should not silo community into one area.
“I see community as a service to the other parts of the business”
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The strongest communities cover as many use cases and value drivers as possible, not just one or two.
Oblinger says many organizations start with one use case, such as how to deliver value or an experience through community, and then try to collect more over time. He lists support, success, product, marketing and developer relations as areas to integrate, and says the best communities have covered their bases across them.
“over time, what you want to do is try to get all of them. You want to collect them, all right?”
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Actions written 10 Oct 2026 from the most useful of 678 recent insights and checked against them.
What was said 790 insights
Sam built a three-year vision with a coupled financial plan, something Pavilion had never had, after realizing he had not answered the board's question about where the business was going.
Sam says the board asked what he wanted to do with the company, and he realized he had not answered that for anyone. He built a three-year vision that specifies what he wants to do, when, and which pieces will go into it. He presented it to the company two weeks before the episode and said it gave him confidence about direction, while acknowledging that building clubs the right way takes time.
“We'd never had like a three-year vision with a coupled financial plan.”
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Fixing the problems caused by opening up Pavilion would take three to five years, and that slow is smooth and smooth is fast.
Sam says the company has to slow down and that fixing the problems will take three to five years. He wants to keep the idea that there can be a Pavilion for everybody while building programs for members who are not the very best and keeping an exclusive top tier.
“It's going to take three to five years to fix”
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After opening up, Pavilion became too diffuse in its focus and lost sight of what had made it work.
Sam says Pavilion expanded from go-to-market executives to CEOs and then began planning an operations collective for CFOs and COOs. He describes this as losing focus on what got the business there.
“we just got so diffuse in our focus”
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Removing the qualification barrier and letting anyone sign up online was the single biggest mistake Pavilion made.
Pavilion, formerly Revenue Collective, originally had strict membership requirements and an application process. After it opened sign-up to everyone, the company moved away from its focus on go-to-market executives and let in CEOs, and Sam says the impact of those decisions was still being worked through years later.
“we made it so that you could sign up online without talking to anybody and we let in so anybody can join. That's the single biggest mistake we've made.”
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Braden sees falling public trust in higher education, driven by price, perceived value and politics, as both a headwind and an opportunity to position A&M as an exception.
He lists rising prices, affordability, access, relevance and usefulness of degrees, and the political environment as forces making families wary of whether, where, and for how long to attend college. He says he likes where A&M sits on the 'pendulum' of what the public wants and frames its role as being a beacon that the American dream is still accessible. Fostering trust is a content pillar for the coming year.
“I think for us it's a giant opportunity. I love where we're positioned in the spectrum or the pendulum of what the American public wants, but the decline in trust, the decline in perceptions of value.”
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It is very hard to be developer-first, enterprise-first and consumer-first at the same time.
Discussing OpenAI's underwhelming consumer reception for Dots, Rory O'Driscoll said doing one thing well is hard and doing two at once is super hard. He said OpenAI struggles with this constantly. Jason Lemkin suggested judging Dots as a persistent coding agent for Codex developers over 30–90 days instead of as a consumer product.
“It's just super hard to be developer forward, enterprise forward and consumer forward at the same time.”
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Jason Lemkin predicts license-and-hire deals will die if one of these lawsuits succeeds, because they already carry double taxation.
Jason Lemkin said the structures are already horrific from a double-taxation perspective. Adding litigation risk and carve-backs for left-behind employees would make them unworkable. He argued many are mergers in substance despite documents saying otherwise, noted the structure is fading as quick deals have become easier under the current administration, and said even if one suit fails another may win.
“I think these deals will die because they already have double taxation.”
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Acquirers knowingly accept legal risk in license-and-hire deals to close overnight instead of waiting months for regulatory review.
Rory O'Driscoll offered a hypothetical: lawyers tell the acquirer they can buy the company on a Sunday night and have employees start Monday, versus filing with the US government and closing in nine months. The CEO accepts some risk. Even if the acquirer later has to settle and add, say, $200M, it may judge the risk worth it.
“I found a way that we can buy this company on a Sunday night and all the employees start on Monday morning”
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Companies whose pre-AI infrastructure suits agents, like Vercel, are seeing agents drive a rapidly growing share of new business.
Harry Stebbings cited Vercel at $600M ARR with agents driving 50% of new business, up from 3% at the start of the year. Jason Lemkin said founder Guillermo could not have foreseen this when founding Vercel in 2020, and pointed to Replit (founded 2016) as another example. From memory, he cited Vercel growing about 170% with roughly a 20% increase in customers, implying huge expansion revenue. From his own heavy building he said agents have opinions that are hard to argue with.
“when agents pick you, it's a force of nature right now.”
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BladeLogic turned down acquisition approaches at several stages before selling to BMC for about $900M on roughly $100M revenue.
Dev Ittycheria said the best companies always get offers. BladeLogic was approached at every stage, including a face-to-face meeting with John Chambers in his office about Cisco buying it, and EMC came to the table. It IPO'd in July 2007 and sold to BMC about a year later for roughly $900M, about 9x revenue, which he called the highest acquisition price paid in 2008. He said the founder ultimately has to decide whether they feel good continuing to build, and that not selling earlier was the right call.
“the best companies always got offers to sell”
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Rory O'Driscoll frames an acquisition offer as a cold-blooded test of whether you can reach 10x the offer.
Rory O'Driscoll said founders evaluating an offer must be cold-blooded about the likely trajectory. The question is how they feel about 'running the tape', and how likely they are to reach not just three times the offer but 10x or more.
“how likely are you to get not just three times this amount, but 10X this amount and more?”
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If you can sell for ~$2B in the first five years and aren't building a generational company, you should probably take it.
Jason Lemkin said company-building comes in five-year chunks that 'take it out of you', and exiting early is much easier. He said he wasn't saying it's a reason to sell. He said that this year he sat in a board meeting where every VC told a company with an offer at about this price not to sell. In his view the decision hinges on whether you're building a 'Mongo or better'.
“You can get out for two billion in the first five years and you're not building Mongo or better. I don't know, man. I would take it and enjoy my life at Salesforce.”
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Dev Ittycheria splits AI apps into 'features masking as companies', which will sell, and franchises built on proprietary data loops.
Dev Ittycheria said a clever product on someone else's platform is frankly a feature, and he expects many such AI app companies to sell to larger companies for their distribution. Durable companies create a loop: usage generates data no one else has, that data improves the product, and the product attracts more usage. Competitors can then copy features but not interactions.
“are you building a feature that's masking as a company or a franchise, right?”
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Jason Lemkin questions whether a ~$20M-revenue AI app can move the needle for a Salesforce-scale acquirer.
Jason Lemkin said he generally likes Salesforce's acquisitions. With Salesforce near $50B and targeting $60B, however, he doubted a $20M next-generation survey product moves the needle. At that scale an acquisition must either tuck in or be big, and he wondered if this one 'will just be kind of forgotten in a couple of years'.
“I don't know how 20 million of revenue of next generation AI survey moves the needle.”
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Rory O'Driscoll sees large, fragmented, pre-technical categories that LLMs do much better, like market research, as top AI app opportunities.
Rory O'Driscoll said market research is a big existing spend category served by consulting firms and the last-generation players Qualtrics, Medallia and SurveyMonkey. He said each reached high-single to low-double-digit billions in market cap. LLMs fit the work well because voice is a solved modality and questions can adapt to answers, unlike canned surveys. He called it a top-five or top-ten app-layer use case, and said Listen Labs executed well and reached real revenue.
“It's an existing category with a big -ass spend, and LLMs just do it so much better”
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Enterprise AI deployments may be stickier than developer or consumer usage because of contracts, training and workflows.
Dev Ittycheria said ChatGPT's roughly billion weekly users are a great distribution channel. He suggested the moat may 'potentially' sit in enterprise, where vendors must sign contracts, train thousands of employees and build workflows. He presented this as an initial reaction, not a firm conclusion.
“You have to sign contracts. You have to train thousands of employees. You have to build workflows and it may be harder to switch”
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Developer buyers show little loyalty and switch quickly to new tools or run several at once.
Drawing on 12+ years selling MongoDB to developers, Dev Ittycheria said developers are quick to jump to the 'shiny new toy'. He used this to explain teams shifting meaningful usage from Anthropic to OpenAI's Codex. He framed the open question as what Anthropic ships next and what alternatives emerge.
“having sold to developers the last 12 plus years is that there's not a lot of loyalty. Developers are very quick to use to switch from one tool to another or frankly use multiple tools”
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AJ Bruno predicts that seat-based SaaS tools that don't move to AI-native services will be forgotten, and that each category will have only one winner.
AJ Bruno says QuotaPath has no choice: without this move it becomes a forgotten SaaS tool, and SaaS tools are not even getting 1x multiples right now. He wants QuotaPath to become the premier AI-native services company, creating a category the way Gainsight once did. He sees Gainsight and QuotaPath as non-competitive allies in getting buyers to accept the new model, and says the old SaaS mentality must change for companies to survive.
“if we do not make this move, we will be a forgotten SaaS. Tool like everyone else and no one no one cares and you're not even getting 1x multiples on SaaS tools right now”
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Trust is the hardest part of selling AI-native services, because customers must accept 'don't worry about how we do it.'
After Josh Schachter described Gainsight telling customers it will own renewals without worrying about how, AJ Bruno said that is the hardest part because it requires an immense amount of trust. Josh agreed that this trust is something built over years. AJ later compares it to QuotaPath, where customers hand over the keys to parts of their data and tech stack.
“But that's the hardest part, though. Don't worry about how we do it is, like, that there's a immense amount of trust that has to go into this process.”
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QuotaPath's path to AI-native services followed a crawl-walk-run sequence: product, then a benchmarking AI platform, then a combined service that takes the work off customers' plates.
AJ Bruno says the crawl was building the product, the walk was building Atlas, its AI-native service tool containing benchmarking data from 50,000+ reps who use QuotaPath daily, and the run is combining the two to run commissions for customers. QuotaPath still sells seats today, but he says that within the next six to 12 months it will have fully pivoted the business. Whether outcome-based pricing makes sense for QuotaPath is still an open question.
“The run is, how do we combine those two things and just take this off of our customers plate in an AI native service way?”
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QuotaPath moved into AI-native services after CFOs said they no longer wanted to handle commissions at all, and found deal sizes expanded when it took the work on.
AJ Bruno gives the example of a CFO with a $150M business and a 15-person RevOps team who, under pressure to automate and create leverage, wanted to stop dealing with commissions. At the start of the year he formed a tiger team and took on a few design partners, and deal sizes expanded quite a bit. Working backwards through the commissions cadence, they found a lot of repeatability: some tasks were binary and automatable, while others were strategic and needed humans in the loop, which is still the case. The service officially launched October 1.
“Commissions is one of those things we just don't want to handle anymore. We don't want to deal with it. And at the beginning of the year, I started to say like, okay, it's a team like let's go create a Tiger team”
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Product-led growth failed for commissions software because the data is sensitive and reps, CROs and RevOps are too disconnected for bottom-up adoption to travel upward.
QuotaPath started as a PLG company expecting reps to adopt it as a personal 'shadow accounting' calculator, share it with their team, and build conviction up to managers and finance. AJ Bruno says those levels turned out to be disconnected: the CRO just wants reps paid correctly and sees it as a distraction, while RevOps handles the plumbing and thinks about cost. He describes a translation problem across all three, and says PLG also kept QuotaPath down market with smaller customers whose use cases it wasn't yet fully handling.
“Well, it turns out those two are actually pretty disconnected. You have the CRO who's like, I just want my team to get paid correctly. It's a distraction.”
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In Gilbo's experience, margin gained through better pricing was usually reinvested in categories or stores that were out of alignment.
He says that when his teams captured value through pricing, they typically reinvested it in a category or set of stores to fix something misaligned in the other direction. He ties this back to value for the end customer, not just the retailer. Stiving summed it up as: without margin you can't reinvest.
“When we'd reap some value in based on pricey we we'd reinvest it in a category or a set of stores and You know try to take care of something that was out of alignment in the other way.”
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Gilbo recommends a regular pricing health check, noting that the fix is often a process change rather than new software or major consulting.
He says teams routinely review category and business health and should do the same for pricing. He still meets many companies running pricing only in Excel, or on a solution installed 10 to 15 years ago that has never been enhanced. He advises looking with fresh eyes and uncovering processes, since the fix may not need software, a big consultant spend or a strategy change.
“I still talk to a lot of people that use Excel only or they've had a pricing solution in place for the last 10, 15 years and they haven't looked to enhance it. Just like anything, look at it with fresh eyes. It could be just a process thing, not needed with software.”
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He moved from consumer to B2B marketing because B2B is more linear and easier to innovate in.
Ross worked in consumer marketing selling scotch and Canadian consumer goods. He found it complex because it required playing on many layers of emotion, both the audience's and the client's, which created drama that didn't influence the buyer. He calls B2B more cut and dry: solve a problem, get paid. He says it is easier to innovate in B2B because most B2B marketers are slow to adopt changes that consumer marketing sees sooner.
“It's easier to innovate. Right. It. Because in B2B most people are slow to respond to the changes that consumer sees quicker.”
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Venture-backed 2021-vintage SaaS companies are in a worse position than PE-owned ones because no shareholder has enough control to act.
Ganesan said PE owners at least have majority control and can restructure. Venture-backed SaaS companies that raised at high multiples have become 'zombies' that nobody owns enough of to fix. For that class, he said the best outcome is being bought by Bending Spoons ('getting spooned', which means getting capital back) and the worst is zero.
“You have a lot of zombie SaaS companies where nobody owns enough to be able to do anything.”
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Ganesan expects more large tech M&A, driven by a permissive regulatory window, competitive pressure, high acquirer equity prices and the urgency to catch up in AI.
Ganesan said a backlog of M&A held up under a different regulatory regime is now moving, and that this window may not last. In his view, each deal forces rival responses, as when AMD's purchase raises the question of whether Nvidia must react. He added that richly valued acquirers can do large deals cheaply relative to their market caps.
“every acquisition forces a bunch of comparative dynamics we have to consider.”
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Marketing, sales and support should report to one leader because the human customer experience is a product in itself.
She said it is common for these functions to roll up to three separate leaders, which produces overlapping strategies rather than one integrated experience. She has repeatedly seen support and sales use different segmentations, which she considers unworkable, and has seen marketing spend misaligned with where sales puts people. Owning all of it makes aligning them her problem.
“one of the things companies don't nail is the human-based customer experience is a product just like the actual product.”
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Manny Medina expects many hyper-verticalized agent companies to be modest in size but very profitable, like Veeva in pharma.
Manny sees agent companies solving very narrow problems in very narrow industries. He argues that owning the whole niche makes them very profitable even if they aren't huge. He cites Veeva, which does a few things only for pharmaceuticals and turned out to be a huge business.
“So they're solving very narrow problems in very narrow industries.”
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Manny Medina chose to build Paid as a system of record rather than a workflow tool, because workflow products face constant churn risk.
Paid owns the record of what the agent did, the credits charged and the auditability of both, which Manny calls a financial record. He acknowledges a higher bar, since billing errors and credit misassignments are a real risk when code is increasingly writing itself. He says workflow tools are like being a shark: always moving, with customers able to churn at any minute.
“I don't want to build workflows anymore because workflows is like being a shark.”
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